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In December 2008, “Siemens A.G., the German engineering giant,” 
settled bribery cases in Germany and the United States by paying fines 
and penalties of more than $1.6 billion.1 The U.S. actions were brought 
under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).  Mr. Reinhard Siekaczek, 
an accountant for the firm, admitted that from 2002 to 2006 he oversaw 
an annual bribery budget of approximately $40–$50 million at Siemens.2  
“Matthew W. Friedrich, the acting chief of the [U.S. Department of Justice’s 
(DOJ) Criminal Division], called the corruption at Siemens ‘systematic 
and widespread.’  Linda C. Thomsen, the [Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s (SEC)] enforcement director, described it as ‘egregious 
and brazen.’  Joseph Persichini Jr., the director of the [Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s (FBI)] Washington field office, which led the investigation, 
called it ‘massive, willful and carefully orchestrated.’”3 
Company managers and sales staff used the slush fund to cozy up to 
corrupt government officials worldwide.  For example, according to 
court documents, Siemens paid $5 million in bribes to the son of 
Bangladesh’s Prime Minister and other senior officials in order to win a 
mobile phone contract in the country.  Mr. Siekaczek’s group also paid 
$12.7 million in bribes to senior officials in Nigeria in order to secure 
government contracts.  In Argentina, a subsidiary of Siemens paid in 
excess of $40 million in bribes to win a $1 billion contract to produce 
national identity cards.  In Israel, Siemens provided $20 million to senior 
government officials to build power plants.  Additionally, Siemens paid 
$16 million to obtain urban rail lines in Venezuela, $14 million for 
medical equipment in China, and $1.7 million to “Saddam Hussein and 
his cronies” in Iraq.4 
After decades of obscurity, the FCPA now occupies center stage in the 
federal government’s war on white-collar crime.5 The DOJ increased the 
 
 1. Siri Schubert & T. Christian Miller, At Siemens, Where Bribery Was Just a 
Line Item, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2008, SundayBusiness, at 1, available at http://www. 
nytimes.com/2008/12/21/business/worldbusiness/21siemens.html. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 6. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Many scholarly articles have been written about the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act.  See generally, Andrea Dahms & Nicolas Mitchell, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 
44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 605 (2007); Tor Krever, Curbing Corruption? The Efficacy of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 33 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 83 (2007); Jack G. 
Kaikati, George M. Sullivan, John M. Virgo, T. R. Carr & Katherine S. Virgo, The Price 
of International Business Morality: Twenty Years Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act, 26 J. BUS. ETHICS 213 (2000); Rebecca Koch, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act:  
It’s Time to Cut Back the Grease and Add Some Guidance, 28 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. 
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number of its FCPA investigations sevenfold during the last three years, 
and that is just the beginning.  The DOJ has publicly announced its 
intention to vigorously enforce the law and is hiring an army of new 
prosecutors just to handle these cases.6 
 No one is immune from FCPA scrutiny.  Current cases and subpoenas 
directed to entire industries are probing every manner of transaction—
from a shipment of rice to the design of a space station.  Whenever U.S. 
business crosses a border, an FCPA investigation is now a distinct 
possibility.7 
 It is well-known that the FCPA not only prohibits bribery of foreign 
officials,8 but imposes reporting obligations on public companies—
somewhat similar to the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002.9  But the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA also apply to private 
businesses—both large and small—and to individuals, both in the 
United States and abroad.  Penalties can include stiff prison terms and 
millions of dollars in fines.  U.S. businesses and citizens can be held 
accountable for the acts of their foreign sales and marketing agents, 
 
REV. 379 (2005); Krever, supra; Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A 
Critical Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 229 
(1997); David E. Dworsky, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 671 
(2009); Justin F. Marceau, A Little Less Conversation, A Little More Action: Evaluating 
and Forecasting the Trend of More Frequent and Severe Prosecutions Under the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 285 (2007); Barbara 
Crutchfield George & Kathleen A. Lacey, Investigation of Halliburton Co./TSKJ’s 
Nigerian Business Practices: Model for Analysis of the Current Anti-Corruption 
Environment on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 503 (2006). 
 6. In an October 2006 speech to the American Bar Association’s FCPA Institute, 
Assistant Attorney General Alice Fisher, then head of the DOJ’s Criminal Division, 
announced an expanded doctrine of FCPA enforcement to “root out global corruption.” 
She was quoted as saying “I want to send a clear message today that if a foreign 
company trades on U.S. exchanges and benefits from U.S. capital markets, it is subject to 
our laws.” Alice Fisher, Assistant Attorney General, speech to the American Bar 
Association’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Institute (Oct. 16, 2006) available at 
www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/pr/speech/2006/10-16-06AAGFCPASpeech.pdf. 
 7. Virginia A. Davidson & Eric S. Zell, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: 
Pitfalls In Doing Business Overseas, THE FEDERAL LAWYER, Nov./Dec. 2008, at 20. 
 8. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a). 
 9. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A); see also Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 & 29 U.S.C.). 
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distributors, and consultants—perhaps even without direct knowledge of 
an illegal payment.10 
 Over the past three decades, the corrupt payment of foreign government 
officials by U.S. business firms has evolved into an important public 
issue connected to the globalization of international trade.  Congress 
enacted the FCPA in 197711 in order to prevent U.S. businesses and 
individuals from using illicit payments to foreign officials “to influence 
any official act, induce unlawful action, or obtain or retain business.”12  
The world economy has evolved substantially in the thirty-two years 
since the FCPA was originally enacted, as international trading by 
multinational corporations from around the world has exploded and new 
markets and new economic powers have emerged. 
Since 1977, several events have contributed to change the way the 
DOJ and the SEC have enforce the FCPA which include: two significant 
amendments to the FCPA in the past twenty-one years, the influence of 
increasing globalization, several significant international agreements, 
and new anti-bribery laws in foreign countries.  This article examines the 
history of the FCPA and its provisions, the historical enforcement of the 
FCPA and its influences on foreign anti-corruption laws, and recent 
trends in enforcement of the FCPA. In order to better portray the 
evolution of FCPA enforcement, a brief history of the origins of this law 
and its provisions will also be provided.  The following sections explain 
the FCPA and detail the events that led to the enactment of the law in 
1977, as well as the subsequent amendments to the law in 1988 and 1998. 
II. HISTORY OF THE FCPA 
The origins of the FCPA enactment can be traced to the Watergate 
hearings and the connection of the Nixon administration to the failed 
burglary of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) headquarters in 
1972.  Although the focus of the Watergate hearings was the attempted 
burglary of the DNC headquarters, what former SEC enforcement chief 
Stanley Sporkin found most interesting were illegal contributions to the 
Nixon reelection campaign made by corporate executives.  These illegal 
 
 10. See, Marie M. Dalton, Efficiency v. Morality: The Codification Of Cultural 
Norms In The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 583, 605 (2006). 
 11. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), (d)(1), (g)–(h), 
78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3, 78ff, amended by Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments 
of 1988, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-3, 78ff, and the International Anti-Bribery and 
Fair Competition Act of 1998, 112 Stat. 3302 (1998) (codified at §§ 15 U.S.C. 78dd-1 to 
78dd-3, 78ff) [hereinafter FCPA]. 
 12. Koch, supra note 5, at 383. 
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contributions prompted Sporkin and his staff to conduct an investigation 
examining the financial reports of these corporations with the purpose of 
determining how these illegal payments were recorded on corporate 
books.13 
Upon further investigation, Sporkin and his team uncovered secret 
mislabeled accounts that had been used to hide various illicit payments, 
including funds used for bribes and other illegal political contributions 
beyond the Nixon reelection campaign.14  The SEC chose to conduct a 
formal investigation following Sporkin’s initial informal investigation, 
the results of which brought to light some $300 million in questionable 
or illegal payments made to foreign government officials, politicians, 
and political parties by over 400 U.S. corporations, 117 of which were 
Fortune 500 companies.15  These revelations caused the resignation of 
many important officials in Japan, the Netherlands, Italy, and other 
countries, as well as considerable public outcry in the United States.16 
After completing these investigations, Sporkin (who later became a 
federal district judge) and the SEC determined that the rash of illegal and 
illicit payments could be curbed if legislation was passed to discourage 
such actions by punishing “public companies that disguise bribes in their 
books,” and in 1977, the U.S. Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act in an attempt to respond to the public pressure to eliminate 
foreign corruption by U.S. firms abroad.17  This new law was enacted as 
an amendment to the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act.18 
A. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977 
The primary objective of the FCPA was to reduce or eliminate illicit 
bribes made by U.S. firms to foreign officials.  Simply stated, “the FCPA 
prohibits any bribe to a foreign official to influence any official act, 
induce unlawful action, or obtain or retain business,” and it requires that 
 
 13. John Gibeaut, Battling Bribery Abroad, A.B.A. J., Mar. 18, 2007, at 50, available 
at http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/battling_bribery_abroad/. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Kaikati et al., supra note 5, at 213, 218. 
 17. Gibeaut, supra note 13, at 50 
 18. Dahms & Mitchell, supra note 5, at 605. 
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publically traded companies achieve certain “standards regarding their 
accounting practices, books, and records.”19 
The FCPA, when enacted in 1977, had two primary provisions: the 
anti-bribery provision and the accounting provision.  The FCPA was first 
amended in 1988 and then again in 1998.  The following sub-sections of 
this article detail the anti-bribery and accounting provisions of the 
FCPA, and the 1988 and 1998 amendments. 
1. Anti-Bribery Provisions 
The anti-bribery provisions were included in the FCPA to deter 
corporations from using bribery as a tool of influence while doing 
business with an official of a foreign nation.  For the SEC and the DOJ 
to successfully hinder the use of illegal and illicit bribery by U.S. 
corporations, the FCPA had to be written in such a way that specifically 
defined bribery: 
The anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA . . . criminalize bribery of a foreign 
official to influence any official act, induce any unlawful action, induce any 
action that would assist in obtaining or retaining business, or secure any 
improper advantage.  These provisions prohibit individuals or businesses from 
directly or indirectly offering, paying, promising, or authorizing to pay money 
or anything of value to any foreign official.20 
In order for a violation of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions to occur, 
the SEC and DOJ must provide specific proof of the violation in 
question.  The FCPA provided a list of elements that must be proven by 
the SEC or DOJ in determining if bribery has occurred; Table 1 lists 














 19. Id. at 612–13. 
 20. Dworsky, supra note 5, at 678–79. 
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Table 1: Elements of an FCPA Bribery Offense 
(i) A U.S. “issuer,” “domestic concern,” or “any person,” including 
the officers, directors, employees, agents, or shareholders acting 
on behalf of the issuer, domestic concern, or person;21
(ii) makes use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of 
interstate commerce;
(iii) in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or 
authorization to pay anything of value;
(iv) to any foreign official, any foreign political party or official 
thereof, or any candidate for foreign political office, or other 
person, knowing that the payment to that other person would be 
passed on to a foreign official, foreign political party or official 
thereof or candidate for foreign political office;
(v) inside the territory of the United States or, for any United States 
personality, outside the United States;
(vi) to corruptly; 
(vii) influence any official act or decision, induce an action or an 
omission to act in violation of a lawful duty, or to secure any 
improper advantage;
(viii) or induce any act or decision that would assist the company in 
obtaining, retaining, or directing business to any person.22 
The FCPA also provides two affirmative defenses—that is, there is no 
liability for payments that are (1) legal in the country in which they are 
made or (2) those considered “reasonable and bona fide expenditures.”23  
Each defense could merit a thorough examination, but are beyond the 
scope of this article. 
In addition to these two affirmative defenses, the FCPA also allows 
corporations to make facilitating, or so called “grease payments,” to 
foreign government officials for “routine government actions,” which by 
 
 21. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a), (g) (for issuers); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a), (i) (for domestic 
concerns) (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a) (for “any person”). 
 22. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3; see also Dahms & Mitchell, supra note 5, 
at 614–15. 
 23. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 
§ 5003, 102 Stat. 1415, 1420–21 (1988). 
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FCPA standards are considered to be “non-discretionary actions” that 
are ordinarily and commonly performed by a foreign official.24  For 
example, obtaining permits, licenses or other official documents, 
expediting lawful customs clearances, obtaining entry or exit visas . . . .”25  
Unfortunately, the FCPA does not specify a cap amount that would be 
considered in excess of grease payment.  The issue of grease payments is 
examined in further detail later in this article.26 
 2. Accounting Provisions 
In addition to the anti-bribery provision, the FCPA also included specific 
provisions with regard to accounting and bookkeeping standards the 
SEC and DOJ should consider when examining a case that may fall 
within the FCPA.  The accounting provisions of the FCPA have been 
described as follows: 
The FCPA amended the Exchange Act by adding record-keeping and internal 
control requirements for certain entities already subject to the Exchange Act’s 
provisions.  As a result, even non-material payments not recorded accurately 
could constitute a violation of U.S. law.  The principal accounting provisions 
are contained in 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) and b(5), which state the record-keeping 
and internal control requirements, as well as the necessary standard to impose 
criminal liability for a failure to meet these requirements.27 
Not only does the FCPA define the accounting provisions, but it also 
specifies the parties to whom the law is intended to apply.  For the 
purposes of law enforcement by the SEC and DOJ, the accounting 
provisions in the FCPA primarily apply to those publicly-held entities 
considered “issuers”—companies that either have securities registered 
with the SEC under section 12 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act or 
are required to file reports under section 15(d) of the Exchange Act.28  
The FCPA offers a further explanation of the parties to whom the 
accounting provisions apply: 
The accounting provisions are broad and apply to all dealings undertaken by the 
issuer, regardless of whether the business actually engages in foreign operations 
or whether the transaction is considered a bribe.  In addition, an issuer that 
 
 24. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b) (2000); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b)(2000) & 15 
U.S.C. § 78dd-3(b)(2000). 
 25. Foley and Lardner, LLP, The FCPA Explained, FCPA ENFORCEMENT, http:// 
fcpaenforcement.com/explained/explained.asp (last visited Oct. 31, 2010). 
 26. See infra Part III.A. 
 27. Dahms & Mitchell, supra note 5, at 609. 
 28. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (2006). See also Dworsky, supra note 5, at 676–77. 
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controls more than fifty percent of the stock of a foreign subsidiary must ensure 
that the subsidiary adheres to the books and records provisions.29 
For the purposes of the FCPA, therefore, an entity that owns more 
than 50% of the voting stock in another entity, as defined by the 
Financial Account Standards Board, is a corporation considered to have 
“control” over the foreign subsidiary. 
B. Amendments to the FCPA 
The FCPA has been amended on two separate occasions: first in 1988 
and then again in 1998.  The first amendment in 1988 was an indirect 
amendment necessary in part due to the passage of the federal Omnibus 
Trade and Competitiveness Act (OTCA).  The second amendment to the 
FCPA occurred in 1998 as a direct amendment to the law.  The 
following subsections outline both amendments to the FCPA. 
1. The 1988 Amendment 
The first amendment to the FCPA came about in the form of the 
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.30  This law was in 
response to slumping foreign trade between the United States and 
international firms, as the U.S. trade deficit continued to grow.31  As one 
scholar noted following of the 1988 amendment to the FCPA: 
During the 1980s, critics began calling for modification of the FCPA.  In 1988, 
the FCPA was revised under the aegis of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness 
Act (OTCA).  According to Senator Heinz, one of the principal sponsors of the 
1988 Amendments to the FCPA, the changes embodied an effort to eliminate 
some exportation obstacles facing U.S. firms in the era of a burdensome trade 
deficit.  Of particular concern were charges that the FCPA as originally enacted 
was so vague as to be indecipherable.  Critics contended that U.S. businesses 
shunned legitimate transactions, the legality of which was difficult to assess 
under the statute’s ambiguous language.32 
 
 29. Dahms & Mitchell, supra note 5, at 609–10; see 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (2006) 
(FCPA text). 
 30. U.S.  DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OMNIBUS TRADE AND COMPETITIVENESS ACT OF 1988, 
H. R. REP. NO. 100-576 (1988) (Conf. Rep.), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
criminal/fraud/fcpa/history/1988/tradeact-100-418.pdf. 
 31. Jennifer Dawn Taylor, Ambiguities in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: 
Unnecessary Costs of Fighting Corruption?, 61 LA . L. REV. 861, 867–70 (2001) (discussing 
competitive disadvantage that American corporations face because of the FCPA). 
 32. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market, supra note 5, at 243. 
BIXBY (DO NOT DELETE) 12/9/2010  2:17 PM 
 
98 
The reasons for addition of the 1988 amendment to the FCPA appear 
to have been three-fold: (1) to promote participation in international 
trade by U.S. corporations, (2) to help participating corporations avoid 
FCPA violations while engaging in international trade, and (3) a direction 
by Congress to the executive branch to “recommend” that other nations 
pass anti-corruption laws.  The second amendment to the FCPA in 1998, 
which is detailed in the following subsection, was passed for very different 
reasons. 
2. The 1998 Amendment 
A decade after the passage of the 1988 amendment to FCPA, the law 
was amended a second time.  Corruption in foreign countries by U.S. 
corporations was still common, even after the 1988 amendment, but by 
1998, the United States and the world economy had undergone dramatic 
change.  The United States had experienced Desert Storm in 1991, but 
more importantly, the global market had opened up with the collapse of 
Communism in Russia and the 1989 destruction of the Berlin Wall. 
With the adoption of the FCPA in 1977, the United States became the 
first country to adopt a sweeping law prohibiting bribery of foreign officials, 
and for many years it was alone in having such a law.  American companies 
often complained that this law put them at a distinct disadvantage in 
obtaining international business since bribery and kickbacks were a 
regular feature of commerce in many nations.33  With the encouragement 
of the United States,34 the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) enacted the “Convention on Combating Bribery 
 
 33. See S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 2 (1998) (describing disadvantages faced by 
American businesses relative to foreign competitors prior to 1998); Taylor, supra note 
23, at 869.  See also Sara Nathan, U.S. Tie Loans to Corruption: Weigh Bribery in Aid 
Decisions, U.S.A. TODAY, Feb. 17, 1999 (industry groups claim $30 billion in lost business 
from mid-1997 to mid-1998). 
 34. “As the United States ramped up the FCPA in 1998, it also persuaded the 30 
industrialized nations belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development to sign a treaty agreeing to adopt similar laws.” Gibeaut, supra note 13, at 
50–51.  Indeed the 1988 Amendments to the FCPA had required that the President 
pursue the negotiation of an international agreement with the member countries of the 
OECD to govern acts prohibited by the FCPA.  H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, 924 (1988) 
(Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547, 1957. See also the discussion of the 
U.S. interests in the OECD treaty at: Andrew Brady Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions: 
Understanding Anti-Bribery Legislation As Economic Sanctions Against Emerging 
Markets, 62 FLA. L. REV. 351, 391–92 (2010). 
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of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions” in 
November 1997 (effective in February 1999).35 
The OECD—an organization originally composed of thirty economically 
strong Western European, North American and Asian nations; but today 
composed of thirty-three members from around the world—was created 
to provide “a setting where governments can compare policy experiences, 
seek answers to common problems, identify good practice and co-ordinate 
domestic and international policies.”36  The purpose of the OECD 
Convention was to combat the widespread effects of bribery throughout 
the world.  According to the organization’s own materials, the OECD 
“brings together the governments of countries committed to democracy 
and the market economy from around the world to:  
• Support sustainable economic growth 
• Boost employment 
• Raise living standards 
• Maintain financial stability 
• Assist other countries’ economic development 
• Contribute to growth in world trade”37 
The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery is not self-executing, 
rather it requires each member nation to enact a law in its own country 
prohibiting bribery of foreign and international officials and organizations.38 
The OECD explains the purpose of the OECD Convention as follows: 
 
 35. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions, INT’L MONETARY FUND, Sept. 18, 2001, at 3, 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/gov/2001/eng/091801.pdf. 
 36. The OECD: What Is It?, ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. 
(2008) at 7, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/33/34011915.pdf. 
 37. About OECD, ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., http://www. 
oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36734103_1_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
 38. All thirty-three OECD countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States) and seven non-signed OECD countries 
(Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Estonia, Slovenia, and South Africa) have signed the 
OECD Convention. See OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions: Ratification Status as of 6 October 
2010, ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org.libproxy. 
boisestate.edu/dataoecd/59/13/40272933.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2010). 
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[T]he Revised Recommendation on Combating Bribery in International Business 
Transactions, adopted by the Council of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) on 23 May 1997 . . . called for effective 
measures to deter, prevent and combat the bribery of foreign public officials in 
connection with international business transactions, in particular the prompt 
criminalization of such bribery in an effective and coordinated manner and in 
conformity with the agreed common elements set out in that Recommendation 
and with the jurisdictional and other basic legal principles of each country . . . .39 
As a founding member of the OECD and a leading proponent of the 
Convention, clearly U.S. compliance with the agreement was important, 
and it became a congressional priority.  In order to properly align the 
FCPA with the OECD convention, the FCPA needed to be amended. 
Congress ratified the OECD Convention and enacted implementing 
legislation, and “these new amendments broadened the reach of potential 
FCPA bribery violations by expanding the scope of persons covered by 
the Act to include some foreign nationals.”40  However, the most important 
effect of the 1998 amendment to the FCPA was that it extended the 
FCPA’s jurisdiction beyond U.S. borders to allow greater enforcement 
efforts by U.S. prosecutors.  Essentially, this meant that the reach of the 
amended FCPA had been expanded and thus allowed for an increase in 
SEC and DOJ enforcement of the FCPA which represented a step 
forward in the battle against corruption in foreign business practices.41 
The 1998 amendment to the FCPA redefined the parties to whom the 
anti-bribery provisions applied.  Prior to the 1998 amendment, the FCPA 
applied only to those persons considered either “issuers” of stock in 
controlling corporations and persons considered part of “U.S. domestic 
concerns” in foreign nations.  The wording in the 1998 amendment added 
the phrase, “any person,” meaning that the FCPA now applied to any 
 
 39. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions, ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., (Apr. 10, 
1998), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdf. 
 40. Dahms & Mitchell, supra note 5, at 607. 
 41. The 1998 amendments subject foreign nationals who are agents or employees 
of U.S. issuers to criminal penalties under the FCPA. Securities Exchanges Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 78ff(c) (2006).  In addition, the 1998 amendments broaden the definition of 
“foreign official” to include any officer of a “public international organization.” 15 
U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f). The FCPA adopts the definition of a “public international organization” 
from the International Organizations Immunity Act. 22 U.S.C. § 288 (2006).  But see 
Barbara Crutchfield George, Kathleen A. Lacey & Julia Birmele, The 1998 OECD 
Convention: An Impetus for Worldwide Changes in Attitudes Toward Corruption in 
Business Transactions, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 485, 515–17 (2000) (discussing potential 
weaknesses and unresolved issues in OECD including the conduct of bribe-takers, 
coercive forms of bribery, the tax deductibility of bribes, and the shortcomings of 
implementing legislation). 
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individual who could be considered an agent of a corporation or any 
official, regardless of governmental level, in a foreign nation.42 
In addition to adding the category of “any person,” the 1998 amendments 
removed the requirement of a territorial nexus between the corrupt act 
and the United States.  Consequently, the FCPA now permits prosecution of 
U.S. issuers and persons for any act regardless of whether any means of 
interstate commerce are used.  The new part of the law expanded the FCPA 
to provide that a foreign company or person was now subject to liability 
if it caused, either directly or through an “agent,” an act in furtherance of 
the corrupt payment to take place within the United States.43  This change 
suggests that the FCPA can reach foreign agents and employees of domestic 
concerns, as well as U.S. nationals living anywhere in the world who 
have very little contact with the United States.44 
This expansive view of federal powers under the FCPA has led to 
criticism by several commentators.  Attorney Justin Marceau argues 
forcefully that the DOJ’s “newly clarified theory of foreign entity liability 
must be challenged in court.  The prosecution of foreign entities, outside 
of certain narrowly defined statutory parameters, must be struck down 
by federal courts.”45 Marceau is particularly critical of the DOJ action 
against DPC-Diagnostics.  This producer of medical equipment admitted 
to paying $1.6 million in bribes to physicians and laboratory personnel 
in China to obtain business there.  Under the 1998 amendment to the 
FCPA, foreign nationals were made subject to the FCPA for the first 
time so long as the person or entity committed an act in furtherance of 
the corrupt payment “while in the territory of the United States.”  
However, DPC was a wholly owned subsidiary of a California company 
and had not committed any of the acts in the United States.46  
Nevertheless the DOJ prosecuted, and obtained a guilty plea based on 
 
 42. The 1998 amendments expand the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the FCPA by 
proscribing bribery committed outside U.S. territory by issuers (including an officer, 
director, employee, agent, or stockholder acting upon behalf of such issuer) and any 
“U.S. person.”  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(g) (for issuers); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(i) (2006) (for 
domestic concerns). 
 43. Carolyn Hotchkiss, The Sleeping Dog Stirs: New Signs of Life in Efforts to End 
Corruption in International Business, 17 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 108 (1998). 
 44. Dahms & Mitchell, supra note 5, at 607. 
 45. Marceau, supra note 5, at 296–310. 
 46. Id. at 294–95, citing Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, DPC (Tianjin) Ltd. 
Charged with Violating The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (May 20, 2005), available at 
www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/press/dpcfcpa.pdf. 
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the theory that DPC was an agent of the American company.  Marceau 
argues that this approach clearly violated the legislative history of, and 
previous case history related to the FCPA.47 
The amendments to the FCPA in 1988 and 1998 changed the 
interpretation of the law and the way the SEC and DOJ investigated 
FCPA violations.  Prior to the amendments, interpretation of the FCPA 
varied due to the confusing, and often vague, wording written into the 
original 1977 law.  For this, and other reasons, enforcement of the FCPA 
during the first quarter century after its enactment was fairly sparse.  
However, the number of FCPA cases brought by the SEC and DOJ has 
exploded in recent years. 
C. FCPA Enforcement 
The next subsections of this report briefly address certain federal anti-
corruption actions taken prior to the enforcement of the FCPA, then 
enforcement of the law after the 1998 amendment to the FCPA, and 
finally the changes in FCPA enforcement that have taken place over the 
past six years.  Tables 2 through 7, which can be found in the appendices 
A, B, and C accompanying this article, provide lists of anti-corruption 
cases brought prior to the enactment of the FCPA, a list of FCPA cases 
prior to the 1998 amendment, and a list of notable FCPA cases initiated 
in the past five years. 
1. The First Twenty-Five Years 
Prior to the enforcement of the FCPA, the DOJ brought a total of 
fifteen cases against corporations and individuals for bribery-related 
offenses that might have fallen under the jurisdiction of the FCPA’s anti-
bribery provision.48  As indicated by this limited number of cases brought 
by the DOJ, as well as by the outcome of those cases, anti-bribery 
enforcement appears to have been concerned with: the Currency and 
Foreign Transactions Reporting Act (CFTRA); Mail and Wire Fraud; 
False statements to Export-Import Bank, the Commerce Department, 
and Agency for International Development; and Conspiracy to defraud 
 
 47. Id. at 309. See also Erik Paulsen, Note, Imposing Limits on Prosecutorial 
Discretion in Corporate Prosecution Agreements, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1434, 1436–37 
(2007). 
 48. SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, FCPA DIGEST OF CASES AND REVIEW RELEASES 
RELATING TO BRIBES TO FOREIGN OFFICIALS UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES 
ACT OF 1977 371–73 (2010), available at http://www.shearman.com/files/upload/FCPA-
Digest-Spring-2010.pdf. 
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the Federal Maritime Administration.49  A list of these pre-FCPA cases 
can be found in Table 2, located in Appendix A of this article. 
This subsection presents a history of the enforcement of the FCPA 
during its initial twenty-five years.  During the first quarter century of 
the FCPA’s history, enforcement of the law appears to have been 
minimal, at best.  Over this time period, the SEC and the DOJ pursued 
only about sixty FCPA cases against corporations in violation of the 
FCPA, or an average of slightly more than two per year.50  Clearly, the 
FCPA was underutilized in achieving the purposes for which the law 
was created.  Additionally, the actual lack of enforcement of the law 
may also indicate how the ambiguous wording in the law may have 
dissuaded companies from venturing overseas for business during the 
first decade of FCPA enforcement.  One author stated: “the 1988 
amendment was largely in response to complaints by U.S. corporations 
that the original Act was too vague and wide in scope.”51 
Enforcement of the FCPA after enactment and up to the 1998 
amendment consisted of DOJ prosecutions of twenty-five cases.52  A list 
of these cases, including dates, parties to the cases, as well as details and 
outcomes is contained in Appendix B of this article within Tables 3, 4, 
and 5.  The outcomes of these twenty-five FCPA cases prosecuted by the 
DOJ resulted in approximately $35.2 million in total fines, fees, and 
penalties levied against the defendants.  The most prominent FCPA 
cases during the first two decades of the law’s enforcement involved the 
illegal sale of U.S. arms to Middle-Eastern nations.53  All of these cases 
involved violations of the FCPA, either bribery or “books and records” 
problems; some also involved violations of the CFTRA; conspiracy to 
violate the FCPA; false statements; and wire fraud and money laundering. 
The following subsection addresses the enforcement of the FCPA 
from 2003 through late 2010. 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. Gibeaut, supra note 13, at 48 
 51. Tor Krever, Curbing Corruption? The Efficacy of the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act, 33 N. C. J. INT’L. & COM. REG. 83, 88 (2007). 
 52. U.S.  DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 30. 
 53. Patrick M. Norton, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Dilemma, 33 CHINA 
BUS. REV. 22, 23 (2006). 
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2. Enforcement from 2003 to the Present 
 In the current post-Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) era, the SEC 
and the DOJ have dramatically increased civil and criminal enforcement 
of the FCPA, compared with the previous twenty-five years.54  Not only 
are these agencies bringing many more cases, but the DOJ is also starting 
to utilize novel theories of liability to prevent corrupt corporations from 
avoiding prosecution.55  As previously mentioned, the relatively low-
level of FCPA enforcement during this period may have been caused by 
the vagueness of this anti-corruption law,56 as well as the blind eye the 
federal government apparently had turned towards the subject of foreign 
corruption by U.S. corporations. 
Since 2004, however, both the SEC and DOJ have begun to 
aggressively enforce the law.  The SEC hired hundreds of employees 
to enforce corporate compliance cases, the DOJ hired two attorneys to 
focus only on FCPA cases, and the FBI created a new four-person unit 
which handles only FCPA investigations.57  Government officials publicly 
announced that they will be monitoring companies for FCPA violations 
more carefully than they have before.58 
 
 54. See, e.g., Emma Schwartz, Hiking the Cost of Bribery, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP., Aug. 13, 2007, at 31 (“[I]n recent years, federal prosecutors have begun cracking 
down on companies and their executives for bribing officials overseas. . . . Using a 1977 
law, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the feds have prosecuted four times the number 
of foreign bribery cases in the past five years as in the preceding five.”). 
 55. Marceau, A Little Less Conversation, supra note 5 at 285.  For example, 
Marceau begins his article with these comments: “In the wake of increasingly common, 
creative, and severe prosecutions under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”), 
scholars and practitioners must acknowledge that the time for talk—i.e., non-punitive 
voluntary disclosures and abstract debate—has given way to an era of aggressive 
enforcement actions by the Department of Justice and the Securities Exchange 
Commission. The bare numbers tell much of the story: the Department of Justice has 
initiated four times more prosecutions over the last five years than over the previous five 
years. Also instructive are prosecutors’ growing use of novel and ever more broad 
theories of liability under the FCPA.” Id. 
 56. See, e.g., Steven R. Salbu, Information Technology in the War Against 
International Bribery and Corruption: The Next Frontier of Institutional Reform, 38 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 67, 89 n.161 (2001). 
 57. Sue Reisinger, On Bended Knee: Companies Are Disclosing Overseas Bribes 
in Record Numbers. But Is Confession Always Necessary?, CORP. COUNSEL (July 1, 
2007), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=900005484219. 
 58. See, e.g., Eric Torbenson, Tougher Laws Have Reduced Financial Fraud, SEC 
Official Says, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 14, 2007, at A5 (quoting Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General Barry Sabin), available at http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/ 
dws/bus/stories/DN-sec_14bus.ART.State.Edition1.35aca7f.html. 
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In 2003, the DOJ prosecuted two FCPA cases, while the SEC failed to 
institute a single FCPA case.59  This total of two FCPA prosecutions in 
2003 represented a fairly typical number of FCPA cases pursued by these 
two federal entities during the previous twenty-five years.60  However, 
2004 proved to be the beginning of change regarding FCPA prosecutions.  
During that year, the DOJ once again prosecuted only two FCPA cases, 
but the SEC brought three FCPA prosecutions, compared to zero in the 
previous year.61 
The number of SEC-prosecuted FCPA cases steadily increased on a 
yearly basis over the next three years.  FCPA prosecutions brought by 
the SEC grew to five in 2005, eight in 2006, then jumped to twenty in 
2007.  Another thirteen actions were brought in 2008, and fourteen more 
instituted in 2009.62  Similarly, FCPA prosecutions by the DOJ during 
this five-year timeframe produced comparable results.63  The DOJ brought 
two prosecutions in 2003, two in 2004, seven in 2005, seven in 2006, 
eighteen cases in 2007, twenty in 2008, and twenty-six in 2009.64 
The activity continues to increase.  In fact, since January of 2007, the 
SEC has brought forty-seven FCPA actions, and the DOJ has instituted 
sixty-four actions—considerably more than all of the actions filed from 
1977–2003.65  These figures do not include the numerous investigations 
currently underway and self-disclosures that will likely lead to FCPA 
enforcement.  The recent trend of increased FCPA enforcement activity 
is best captured in the following chart and graph, which each track the 
number of FCPA enforcement actions filed by DOJ and the SEC during 
the past six years:66  
 
 
 59. Gibson, Dunn, & Crutcher, LLP, 2007 Year-End FCPA Update (Jan. 4, 2008), 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2007Year-EndFCPAUpdate.aspx [hereinafter 
Gibson, Dunn 2007 Year-End FCPA Update]. 
 60. From 1978 to 2000, the federal government “averaged only about three FCPA-
related prosecutions a year.” Priya Huskins, FCPA Prosecutions: Liability Trend to 
Watch, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1449 (2008). 
 61. Gibson, Dunn 2007 Year-End FCPA Update, supra note 59. 
 62. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, 2009 Year-End FCPA Update (Jan. 4, 2010), 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/Publications/Pages/2009Year-EndFCPAUpdate.aspx [hereinafter 
Gibson, Dunn 2009 Year-End FCPA Update]. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. (chart and graph). 






The following are a few examples of recent FCPA enforcement and 
compliance actions: 
• In September 2010 the SEC announced that it had reached a 
settlement with ABB Ltd, a Swiss engineering company, to 
pay $39.3 million in fines (without admitting guilt) regarding 
charges for violating the FCPA.  ABB and two subsidiaries, ABB 
Inc. of Sugar Land, Texas and ABB LTD-Jordan, based in 
Amman, had been charged with paying more than $2.7 million in 
bribes to receive contracts worth $100 million.  ABB Ltd. later 
agreed to pay the DOJ $19 million in criminal fines and pleaded 
guilty to one count of conspiracy and one count of violating 
the FCPA to settle its subsidiaries legal matters.67 
• Daimler AG agreed in March 2010 to pay $185 million (split 
almost evenly between the SEC and DOJ) to settle allegations 
that it had committed serious violations of the FCPA.  The 
DOJ had accused the German automaker of making hundreds 
 
 67. ABB To Pay $39.3 Million to Settle Subsidiaries’ FCPA Violations, WALL ST. 
J., Sept. 29, 2010, http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2010/09/29/abb-to-pay-393-
million-to-settle-subsidiaries-fcpa-violations/. 
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of improper payments worth tens of millions of dollars to 
secure government contracts in at least twenty-two countries, 
including China, Russia and Greece.68 
• On January 19, 2010, following a “sting” operation at a Las 
Vegas trade show, the DOJ indicted twenty-two executives and 
employees in the military and law enforcement equipment 
industry for engaging in a scheme to bribe the minister of 
defense of an African country.  This action involved 150 FBI 
agents, was the first use of undercover techniques to discover 
FCPA violations, and was the largest single investigation and 
prosecution against individuals to date.69 
• In February 2009, Halliburton and its KBR subsidiary agreed 
to pay $579 million in disgorgement and penalties to settle 
charges that one of its former units bribed Nigerian officials 
during the construction of a gas plant.70 
• As we noted at the beginning of this article, on December 15, 
2008, the SEC announced an “unprecedented settlement” of 
$800 million with Siemens AG as a result of extensive and 
systematic practices that violated the FCPA.  Siemens AG also 
settled with the German Government for $854 million for the 
same violations, for a combined historic penalty of $1.654 
billion related to foreign corrupt practices.71 
• In September 2008, Albert “Jack” Stanley, former officer and 
director of Halliburton, admitted that he had conspired to pay 
Nigerian officials $180 million for engineering, procurement, 
 
 68. Vanessa Fuhrmans & Thomas Catan, Daimler to Settle With U.S. on Bribes, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 2010, B1. 
 69. Ronald W. Breaux et al., Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: 
The Hits Keep Coming, HAYNES & BOONE, LLP, Feb. 1, 2010, http://www.haynes 
boone.com/enforcement_of_the_fcpa/. 
 70. Alan M. Field, Long Arm, Getting Longer, J. OF COM., Dec. 21, 2009, 26, 
available at http://www.joc.com/trade/long-arm-getting-longer. According to the indictment, 
Jeffrey Tesler, a U.K. solicitor acting as agent for the joint venture partners in the Bonny 
Island natural gas pipeline project, passed along millions of dollars from the joint venture 
to top-level Nigerian officials in exchange for the award of more than $6 billion in 
contracts.  Included in the recipients were 3 vice-presidents of the government. Gibson, Dunn 
2009 Year-End FCPA Update, supra note 62, at 3. 
 71. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Siemens AG for Engaging 
in Worldwide Bribery (Dec. 15, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-
294.htm. 
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and construction contracts spanning more than a decade.  Stanley 
now faces years in prison and $10.8 million in fines.72 
• That same month, a sixty-two-year-old assistant to the vice 
president for a telecommunications company, Alcatel CIT, was 
sentenced to thirty months in prison for paying $2.5 million to 
Costa Rican officials in exchange for $149 million in mobile 
telephone contracts. 
• On May 14, 2008, Wilbros Group, Inc., an engineering and 
construction company, reached a $32.3 million settlement with 
the DOJ and SEC for bribing Nigerian and Ecuadorian officials 
and failing to keep adequate records pursuant to the FCPA.73 
• In the largest penalty in 2007, Baker Hughes entered into              
a plea agreement with the SEC and the DOJ that led to a 
combined fine of $44 million.74 
• In November 2007, Chevron agreed to pay $30 million in civil 
and criminal penalties for: (1) unlawful kickbacks under the 
UN Oil for Food Program during Saddam Hussein’s rule in 
Iraq, and (2) the failure to maintain proper books and records 
as required by the FCPA.75 
• In October 2007, Ingersoll-Rand Co. paid $2.5 million in civil 
and criminal penalties for the travel and entertainment 
expenses spent on eight Iraqi officials that exceeded $20,000.76 
These very different cases indicate the government is looking for targets 
large and small, individual and corporate, public and private, high-tech 
and low-tech.  Anyone considering doing business overseas needs a 
basic understanding of the FCPA and needs to develop some simple 
compliance strategies. 
 
 72. See also, Barbara Crutchfield George & Kathleen Lacey, Investigation of 
Halliburton Co./TSJ’s Nigerian Business Practices: Model for Analysis of the Current 
Anti-Corruption Environment on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement, 96 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 503, at 503–05 (2006) (describing the confluence of French, 
DOJ, SEC, and Nigerian investigations into Halliburton/TSKJ). 
 73. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Willbros Group and Former 
Employees with Foreign Bribery (May 14, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/ 
2008-86.htm. 
 74.  Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Baker Hughes, Inc., Acct’g and Auditing. Enforc. 
Rel. No. 2602, 2007 SEC LEXIS 858, at *1–7 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 26, 2007); United States 
v. Baker Hughes Servs. Int’l, Inc., No. 4:07-CR-00129 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2007). 
 75. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Chevron Corp., No. 07 CIV 10299, 2007 SEC 
LEXIS 2625, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2007). 
 76. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., No. 07-CV-01955, 2007 SEC 
LEXIS 2532, at *5 (D.D.C. Oct. 31, 2007). 
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A brief list of some notable FCPA cases prosecuted by both the SEC 
and DOJ over the past six years can be found in Tables 6 through 8, 
located in Appendix C of this report.  These tables contain the dates, 
names of the parties to the cases, and details and outcomes of each case.  
By examining the sample list of cases presented in Tables 6 through 8, 
the significant increase in FCPA prosecutions throughout the past six 
years can be evidenced, not only by the numbers of cases, but also by the 
amount of fines, fees, and penalties levied against the defendants. 
One important difference between FCPA prosecutions in previous 
decades compared to those of the past five years is that the penalties now 
often include the disgorgement of profits tied to the actions deemed to be 
FCPA violations.  In the past few years, the SEC and DOJ have been 
regularly demanding the disgorgement of profits when dealing with 
FCPA violators.  Inclusion of these profits has led to a dramatic increase 
in the level of the total amount of fines, fees, and penalties levied by the 
SEC and DOJ.  For the cases included in Tables 6 through 8 included in 
Appendix C of this article, the total amount of fines, fees, and penalties, 
with disgorged profits included, is a total of $2,421,681,799. 
Note that Tables 6 through 8 in Appendix C is not a complete list of 
FCPA prosecutions since 2002.  It also should be noted that in the case 
against Titan Corporation,77 the total fine included, “a criminal fine of 
$13 million, along with a civil penalty and disgorgement to the SEC in 
the amount of approximately $15.5 million. . . . The combined penalty, 
$28.5 million, was at that time the largest fine ever imposed on a 
company in the history of the FCPA.”78  Considering the size of this fine 
against a single corporation, amounting to nearly as much as the total 
fines levied by the DOJ and SEC prior to 2002, it is easy to see that the 
federal government has changed its position on corruption significantly. 
The increases in the numbers of FCPA cases brought by the federal 
government in recent years can be attributed to new trends and creative 
prosecution of FCPA violations by the SEC and DOJ.  The following 
section and subsections of this report address such trends. 
 
 77. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. The Titan Corp., No. CIV.A. 05-0411 (S.D. Cal. 
Mar. 1, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr19107.htm. 
 78. DANFORTH NEWCOMB, FCPA DIGEST OF CASES AND REVIEW RELEASES RELATING 
TO BRIBES TO FOREIGN OFFICIALS UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT OF 1977 
114 (2007). 
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III. RECENT FCPA ENFORCEMENT TRENDS 
A. “Grease” Payments 
According to Alexandra Wrage, president of a U.S. firm that provides 
much anti-bribery training for U.S. and foreign businesspeople engaged 
in overseas commerce, the ambiguous wording of the FCPA and the 
breadth of interpretations of what constitutes a violation continue to 
create problems for businesses operating in foreign nations.79 
Although the FCPA prohibits nearly all forms of gifts or monetary 
contributions to high-level foreign officials, the law does allow for the 
use of “facilitating payments” made to low-level foreign officials for the 
purposes of expediting or secure performance of government actions 
considered routine.  This type of bribe, often called a “grease payment,” 
is permitted under the FCPA.80  Unfortunately, the ambiguity of the 
FCPA has created problems in determining the level of monies that are 
allowed to be made in the form of grease payments, as the FCPA does 
not provide a cap for legal facilitating payments.  However, although 
nothing in the law sets any limit, in practice, there appears to be a maximum 
ceiling of about $1,000 for grease payments.81 
While many critics like Koch believe that the legality of grease 
payments only contributes to the much larger problem of corruption that 
the FCPA was created to curb, others point out that this form of payment 
is a regular cost of doing business overseas that can easily be hidden.  In 
his 2006 article, Segal addresses the issue of what the SEC or DOJ could 
do to better enforce the FCPA against corrupt corporations that successfully 
hide bribes and other FCPA-prohibited payments in financial statements: 
[I]ncreasing the difficulty of tracing money is a critically important part of any 
corrupt enterprise’s operation if it wishes to avoid detection.  A review of the 
cases shows that more than half of those caught bribing could either have 
avoided detection easily, or made it much more difficult to prosecute them had 
only simple steps been taken to disguise money flows.  As a result, without greatly 
increased funding for investigation, the FCPA is a flawed model on which to base 
all expectations of foreign bribery deterrence.82 
 
 79. Sheri Qualters, Risk of Bribe Probes Grows for Business, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 7, 
2008, at 9.  Another article quoted Ms. Wrage as stating that when she offered a course 
dealing with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in Dubai in 2005 only 20 people showed 
up, but when the course was offered again in November 2006 more than 220 people 
attended, some from as far away as Bangladesh and Greece. Gibeaut, supra note 13, at 48. 
 80.  Koch, supra note 5, at 380. 
 81. Dahms & Mitchell, supra note 5, at 617–18. 
 82. Philip Segal, Coming Clean on Dirty Dealing: Time for a Fact-Based Evaluation 
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 18 FLA. J. INT’L L., 169, 171–72 (2006). 
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“Facilitating” or “grease payments” represent one example of the 
problems with FCPA interpretation, and it is differences in interpretation, 
as well as an increase in government and social pressure, both domestically 
and abroad, which have created new trends of FCPA enforcement and 
interpretation.  The following subsections of this article detail some of 
the more significant changes in enforcement of the FCPA that have taken 
place over the past six years, including the enforcement of the FCPA 
against individuals, FCPA enforcement in foreign countries, and the 
self-reporting of FCPA violations by corporations.83 
B. FCPA Enforcement against Individuals 
One of the more important trends in FCPA enforcement in recent 
years has been the application of the FCPA against individual persons.  
During 2006, the DOJ and SEC aggressively pursued FCPA action 
against ten individuals in seven separate cases,84  and FCPA charges 
were filed in cases against fifteen individuals during 2007.85  Although 
the FCPA is commonly perceived—and perhaps, historically speaking, 
with good reason—to be a statute of predominantly corporate enforcement, 
60% of the FCPA defendants in 2008 were individuals.  Mark 
Mendelsohn, the Deputy Chief of the Fraud Section in DOJ’s Criminal 
Division and DOJ’s top-FCPA enforcer for several years, said of the 
continuing trend of holding individuals to answer for foreign bribery: 
“To really achieve the kind of deterrent effect we’re shooting for, you 
have to prosecute individuals.”86  SEC Associate Director Fredric Firestone, 
speaking at a separate engagement, expressed a similar sentiment: “The 
Commission [SEC] very clearly has stated to us that enforcement actions 
 
 83. See Philip Urofsky & Danforth Newcomb, Recent Trends and Patterns in 
FCPA Enforcement, Shearman & Sterling LLP, October 1, 2009, available at http:// 
www.shearman.com/files/upload/LT-100209-FCPA-Digest-Recent-Trends-and-Patterns-
in-FCPA-Enforcement.pdf. 
 84. F. Joseph Warin, Robert C. Blume, Jeremy A. Bell & J. Taylor McConkie,  
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act:  Recent Developments, Trends, and Guidance, 21 
Insights 2, 4–5 (Feb. 2007), available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Docu 
ments/Warin-Blume-FCPA-RecentDevelopmentsTrendsandGuidance.pdf. 
 85. Gibson, Dunn 2007 Year-End FCPA Update, supra note 59. 
 86. Dionne Searcey, To Combat Overseas Bribery, Authorities Make It Personal, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2009, at A 13, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1254958 
62894771979.html?mod=article-outset-box. 
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against individuals as well as companies is a priority.”87  The message 
seems to be effective.  Sharie Brown, who heads the FCPA practice at 
the law firm DLA Piper, says the new strategy has prompted corporate 
boards and senior managers to strengthen compliance measures to ward off 
bribery.  Brown added: “Imprisonment is something that few senior 
executives ever think they will face.”88 
Not only have federal cases been brought against U.S. citizens for FCPA 
violations, cases have also been brought against foreign individuals as 
well.  In 2006, the DOJ brought FCPA charges against an Iraqi citizen 
employed by a government contractor working in Iraq: 
On March 24, 2006, the DOJ announced that Faheem Mousa Salam, an 
employee of a government contractor working in Iraq, had been arrested and 
charged with violating the FCPA.  According to the criminal complaint, Salam 
offered a bribe to a senior official with the Iraqi Police to induce him to 
purchase a map printer and 1,000 armored vests. . . . Salam also met and 
discussed additional improper payments with an undercover agent posing as a 
U.S. procurement officer.  On August 4, 2006, the DOJ announced that Salam 
pled guilty to an FCPA anti-bribery charge. . . . the case is notable in that it was 
based only on an offer of an improper gift, rather than an actual payment.  It 
also provides a rare example of the use of the statute’s nationality-based 
jurisdiction to charge an individual.89 
An additional case exists involving a foreign individual charged with 
FCPA violations.  In United States v. Si Chan Wooh, Wooh was named 
as a defendant in a separate case related to the case against Schnitzer 
Steel and SSI International Far East, Ltd: 
Wooh, a former Executive Vice President and head of SSI, conspired with 
Schnitzer Steel, SSI, and SSI International Far East, Ltd.  (a South Korea-based 
wholly-owned subsidiary of Schnitzer managed by SSI) to make payments to 
officers and employees of government-owned customers in China to induce 
them to purchase scrap metal.  The payments were made to foreign officials 
primarily in the form of commissions, refunds, and gratuities via off-book 
foreign bank accounts.90 
The Salam and Wooh cases demonstrate that the SEC and DOJ are 
instituting FCPA enforcement against individuals involved in bribery, 
not just in the United States, but in foreign nations, as well. 
 
 87. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP, 2008 Year-End FCPA Update (Jan. 5, 2009), 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/Publications/Pages/2008Year-EndFCPAUpdate.aspx [hereinafter 
Gibson, Dunn 2008 Year-End FCPA Update]. 
 88. Searcey, supra note 87. 
 89. Margaret Ayes, John Davis, Nicole Healy & Alexandra Wrage, Developments 
in International Efforts to Prevent Corruption, 41 INT’L L. 597, 599 (2007). 
 90. NEWCOMB, supra note 78, at 18. 
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C. FCPA Enforcement in Foreign Nations 
Speaking at an FCPA conference, DOJ’s Mendelsohn called 2008 the 
year of “foreign coordination.”91  Obviously, the biggest single instance was 
the Siemens case, where the U.S. officials worked with German colleagues.  
The DOJ’s Friedrich echoed this sentiment: “We are now working with 
our foreign law enforcement colleagues in bribery investigations to a 
degree that we never have previously.”92  And, as reported in the Wall 
Street Journal, anti-bribery prosecutors from around the globe gathered 
in Paris during the summer of 2008 for an “informal, roll-up-your sleeves 
meeting” as part of a first-of-its kind effort to increase collaboration in 
international investigations.93  Not only have the SEC and the DOJ 
stepped up enforcement of the FCPA in the United States, but other 
nations are increasingly active in bringing charges against non-U.S. 
citizens and companies for corruption and bribery.  As one author has 
noted: 
One of the clearest trends in Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement 
today is increased cooperation between the authorities of the United States and 
those of other nations—and the consequent rise of multijurisdictional 
investigations.  The U.S. Department of Justice is more than ever before reaching 
out to its counterparts, particularly in Western Europe, to share evidence and 
theories and obtain access to witnesses.94 
European Union nations, including Germany and the United Kingdom 
(U.K.), appear to be coordinating with U.S. law enforcement in major 
corruption cases, such as the Siemens matter.  In addition, one of the 
earliest FCPA actions against a foreign corporation involved cooperation 
between the United States and Norway: 
The Norwegian energy company Statoil ASA became the subject of the first 
criminal FCPA enforcement action against a non-U.S. company over a plan to 
bribe an Iranian government official in exchange for oil and gas development 
contracts.  The guilty plea agreement announced in October specifically 
mentioned that the Norwegian authorities conducted their own investigation 
and, to underscore the point about multinational cooperation, the $21 million 
 
 91. Gibson, Dunn 2008 Year-End FCPA Update, supra note 88. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Mark Miller, Corruption Cases Go International, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 26, 2007, at 
S1. 
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penalty imposed in the United States was reduced by the amount of the penalty 
levied by the Norwegians.95 
Foreign investigations involving FCPA violations is a good sign in the 
battle against corruption, but are these types of investigations easy?  As 
Miller points out, “involvement of a foreign jurisdiction only compounds 
the variables affecting . . . decisions” of a company deciding on the 
appropriate steps to take when FCPA violations are involved.96 
There have been other cases involving FCPA prosecution against 
firms in foreign nations since the Statoil ASA case.  Other notable FCPA 
cases involving foreign corporations include United States v. Vetco Gray 
Controls, Inc. et al.,97 and United States v. SSI International Far East, 
Ltd.98 In the Vectco Gray case, a subsidiary of the firm, Vetco Gray U.K. 
Ltd., was named as a defendant and levied with the largest fine of the 
company’s three subsidiaries, a $12 million fine.  According to Newcomb, 
SSI International Far East, Ltd. was named in their case because, “SSI 
Korea made payments to officers and employees of private customers in 
South Korea and private and government-owned customers in China to 
induce them to purchase scrap metal.99  The payments were made to 
foreign officials primarily in the form of commissions, refunds and 
gratuities via off-book foreign bank accounts.”100  Vetco Gray and SSI 
International are both contained within the information found in 
Appendix C. 
The FCPA enforcement against individuals—in both the United States 
and abroad—and FCPA enforcement against foreign corporations are 
two of the most noticeable trends in enforcement of the FCPA.  However, 
another trend of enforcement tactics by the DOJ and SEC must be 
mentioned.  Companies that find themselves in violation of the FCPA 
are now reporting the violations directly to the SEC and the DOJ in 
hopes of avoiding the stiffer penalties and potentially devastating fines 
similar to the $28.5 million levied against Titan Corporation. 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at S4. 
 97. United States v. Vetco Gray Controls, Inc., No. 4:07-CR-00004-001-003 (S.D. 
Tex. Feb.17, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/vetco-
controls.html. 
 98. United States v. SSI Int’l Far East, Ltd., No. CR-06-398-KI (D. Or. Oct. 17, 
2006). 
 99. NEWCOMB, supra note 78, at 25. 
 100. Id. 
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D. Self-Reporting of FCPA Violations 
Aside from the enforcement of the FCPA against individuals, and the 
enforcement of the FCPA against foreign corporations, the next most 
prominent trend in FCPA enforcement is the self-reporting of FCPA 
violations by corporations.  The DOJ and the SEC have taken a more 
lenient approach to self-reported illegalities when seeking a sentence for 
FCPA violations—at least that is their claim.101 If a corporation has 
committed an FCPA violation and brings this fact to the attention of the 
SEC or DOJ prior to either agency’s discovery of the deviation of the 
law, the punishment for the violation is typically less significant than 
those handed down to violators whose undisclosed FCPA digressions are 
first discovered by the federal government in an FCPA investigation.  
DOJ point man for FCPA issues, Mark Mendelsohn, has stated that 
“self-reporting won’t wipe the slate clean,” but that the DOJ, “looks 
favorably on corporate confession if it turns into a prosecution.”102  
Mendelsohn added: “We reward disclosure and genuine cooperation.”103  
Most significantly, the influence of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and 
the rising economic power of China have had the greatest influence on 
the recent trends in FCPA enforcement.  The following section and 
subsections examine the influences of Sarbanes-Oxley and China on 
changes in FCPA enforcement. 
IV. INFLUENCES ON CHANGES IN FCPA ENFORCEMENT 
As presented in previous sections, enforcement of the FCPA appeared 
to be fairly insignificant from the enactment of the law until recent 
trends in FCPA enforcement emerged, and the number of cases brought 
by the SEC and DOJ increased significantly over a relatively short period of 
time.  It appears that this increase in FCPA enforcement, as well as 
creative enforcement by the federal government, has been influenced by 
a number of variables.  The enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(SOX) and the emergence of China and other nations as global economic 
powers appear to have had a significant influence on the increase in the 
 
 101. Id. at 7. 
 102. Joshua Lipton, Kicking Back at Kickbacks, 6 CORP. COUNS. 17 (Dec. 1, 2006), 
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=900005467424#. 
 103. Id. 
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number of FCPA cases in recent years.  This section of the article focuses 
on the influence of SOX on the enforcement of the FCPA. 
Following the Enron debacle and the subsequent WorldCom scandal 
in 2001 and 2002, the U.S. federal government took action to avoid 
similar situations from taking place in the future.  With hopes of placing 
more responsibility on top executives and decision makers for future 
corporate collapses similar to those of Enron and WorldCom, Congress 
passed the SOX in 2002.  This SEC-enforced law proclaims that corporate 
accounting records must be totally accurate and that all financial 
statements be publically certified by the CEO and CFO of publically 
held corporations.104  Professor Prentice has stated that SOX requires: 
[T]hat CEOs and CFOs of public companies certify that the company’s periodic 
reports do not contain material misstatements or omissions and ‘fairly present’ 
the firms’ financial condition and results of operations.  In addition, the officers 
must affirm that they are responsible for the internal controls, have designed 
them to ensure that material information is brought to their attention, have 
evaluated their effectiveness, have presented in the report their conclusions 
about their effectiveness, and have discussed in the report any changes in the 
internal controls, including corrective actions taken.  Section 906(a) creates a 
new criminal penalty for officers who knowingly certify an inaccurate financial 
statement.  Finally, and most significantly, SOX [section] 404 requires the filing 
of a management report attested to by the external auditor assessing the 
reliability of the issuer’s internal financial controls.105 
Not only has the impact of SOX on corporations curbed “massive 
securities frauds that undermined the very heart of the federal securities 
laws,”106  but it has also had an impact on the enforcement of the FCPA.  
According to LaCroix: “[T]he primary reason for the dramatic increase 
in the number of FCPA enforcement actions is the self-examination 
required under [SOX], interacting with the self-reporting compelled under 
the federal prosecutorial guidelines for corporate criminality.”107  SOX 
requires senior management to carefully scrutinize their company’s internal 
controls and processes.  Increased scrutiny often leads to increased self-
identification of FCPA concerns.108 
The effect of SOX on the changes in FCPA enforcement may not be 
that obvious, however, SOX is arguably the most important piece of 
 
 104. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 302, 116 Stat. 745, 
777–78 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2000)). 
 105. Robert Prentice, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Evidence Regarding the Impact of SOX 
404, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 703, 705–06 (2007). 
 106. Id. at 705. 
 107. Kevin LaCroix, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A ‘70s Revival and Growing 
D&O Risk, NAT’L UNDERWRITER PROP. & CASUALTY, Apr. 2, 2007 at 21. 
 108. Id. 
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corporate legislation passed by Congress since the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934.  The law created a situation in which corporate 
executives can now be held personally accountable for any misleading 
financial information hidden behind the numbers of financial statements.  
Combined with FCPA, SOX creates a double-edged sword for the SEC 
to wield in the battle against corruption. 
V. OTHER IMPORTANT FCPA ISSUES NEEDING                                                 
FURTHER EXAMINATION 
There are many other significant issues involved with, or related to, 
the enforcement of the FCPA, which need more research, but are beyond 
the scope of this article. Some of the most important, or most interesting 
to this author are: 
• Emergence of China as a Global Economic Power.  The effect 
of the growing power of China, not only on the world economy, 
but on the enforcement of anti-bribery laws and treaties. It has 
often been stated that bribery is a regular part of doing business in 
China109 (although those who study China would argue that the 
concepts of guanxi and hong bao are much more complicated 
than mere “bribery”).110  Since so many business firms operating 
 
 109. “Widespread corruption in China puts many U.S. companies between the 
proverbial rock and a hard place…China’s leaders have long acknowledged that 
widespread corruption is one of the country’s main problems and have repeatedly vowed 
to eliminate it.” Patrick M. Norton, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Dilemma, 33 
CHINA BUS. REV. 22 (2006). 
 110. See, e.g., Alexandra A. Wrage, Bribes and Transparency on Chinese Holidays: 
a Primer, WALL ST. J. CHINA REALTIME REP. BLOG (Jan. 23, 2009, 2:23 AM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2009/01/23/bribes-and-transparency-on-chinese-holid 
ays-a-primer/ (Hong Bao are the “‘red envelopes’ stuffed with money traditionally 
given between friends, family and business partners during the Spring Festival”).   
Guanxi is a complex term which begins with “connections” and  represents the ancient 
Chinese belief in doing business only with those who already know, or have some 
connection with, and the necessity of forming and maintaining such relationships 
through a variety of means. See, e.g., Tom Dunfee & Danielle E. Warren, Is Guanxi 
Ethical? A Normative Analysis of Doing Business in China, 32 J. BUS. ETHICS 191 
(2001).  Another source states: “Guanxi. It’s the first word any businessperson learns 
upon arriving in China.  Loosely translated, guanxi means ‘connections’ and, as any 
China veteran will tell you, it is the key to everything: securing a business license, 
landing a distribution deal, even finding that coveted colonial villa in Shanghai. Fortunes 
have been made and lost based on whether the seeker has good or bad guanxi, and in 
most cases a positive outcome has meant knowing the right government official, a 
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in China are totally or partially owned by the Chinese government 
and strongly influenced by Communist party officials, many 
business managers or officers who receive bribes or other 
payments may well also be considered “government officials,” 
and thus such payment would violate the FCPA.111  As China 
moves to the center of global commerce, the interaction of 
Chinese business practices and customs with international laws 
will be most interesting to follow. 
• Foreign National Anti-Corruption Laws.  In the past decade 
there have been a series of international treaties and agreements 
reached, all aimed at combating bribery and corruption, and 
many nations have enacted their own anti-bribery laws.  In 
recent years, foreign anti-corruption enforcement has also 
taken center stage in nations such as Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, 
China, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Germany, India, 
Namibia, Sweden, and the U.K.112  How these laws will be 
enforced and how U.S. officials will cooperate and interact with 
foreign enforcers will bear watching. 
• International Treaties.  The most well-known global anti-
corruption treaty occurred with the 1998 signing of the OECD 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials.  
This treaty required that the thirty-five member nations of the 
OECD enact anti-bribery laws, and all have done so.  This law 
has spurred the enactment of many national laws as discussed 
above.113  But there are also several other important international 
agreements such as: (1) The Committee of Experts of the 
Follow-Up Mechanism for the Inter-American Convention 
Against Corruption; (2) The Group of States Against Corruption 
(GRECO); (3) The United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption; (4) the United Nations Global Compact’s 10th 
Principle Against Corruption; and (5) The World Bank’s 
Department of Institutional Integrity (INT).  Regional 
organizations such as the Organization of American States, the 
Council of Europe, and more recently the African Union, have 
 
relationship nurtured over epic banquets and gallons of XO brandy.” Frederick Balfour, 
You Say Guanxi, I Say Schmoozing, BUS. WK., Nov. 19, 2007, at 84. 
 111. Patrick M. Norton, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Dilemma, CHINA BUS. 
REV., Nov.–Dec. 2006, at 22–23. 
 112. Ayes et al., supra note 87, at 604–07. 
 113. See supra notes 27–35 and text accompanying. 
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also developed anti-corruption conventions.  The scope and 
influence of each agreement will require more research. 
• Anti-Corruption Non-Governmental Organizations.  International 
business activities by corporations and business people around 
the globe are being scrutinized more than ever before.  At the 
same time, several new anti-corruption compliance organizations 
(NGOs) have been founded in recent years, with the goal of 
promoting corporate compliance with corruption laws.114  
These anti-corruption compliance organizations include such 
organizations as (1) Transparency International; (2) The Corner 
House; (3) The International Anti-Corruption Conference; 
(4) TRACE; and (5) The Center for International Private 
Enterprise (CIPE); (6) Business for Social Responsibility, and 
many more.  These organizations serve as watchdogs to report 
corruption, and many also help business firms design and 
implement compliance policies to detect bribery before it 
becomes public.  What role will they play in the future of 
international business? 
• Does the FCPA Represent Moral Imperialism?  Late in the 
research for this article, the author came across a fascinating 
series of articles arguing both sides of this question.  Professor 
(now Dean) Steven Salbu wrote a series of thoughtful articles 
about ten years ago advocating the position that the FCPA and 
other anti-bribery laws represent an imposition of one particular 
set of Western ethical principles on the rest of the world who 
may not share this ethical, legal basis.115  While some scholars 
agree, there have also been a number of well-written articles by 
 
 114. See generally Michael Goldhaber, Dirty Companies for Sale, 27 AM. LAW., 
Mar. 4, 2005, 13–14, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/law/sfb/lawArticleSFB.jsp?id 
=900005543369.  
 115. See generally Steven R. Salbu, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a Threat 
to Global Harmony, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 419, 441 (1999); Steven R. Salbu, Are 
Extraterritorial Restrictions on Bribery a Viable and Desirable International Policy 
Goal Under the Global Conditions of the Late Twentieth Century? 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 
223 (1999); Steven R. Salbu, Battling Global Corruption in the New Millennium, 31 L. & 
POL’Y INT’L BUS. 47 (1999); Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical 
Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 229 (1997); 
Steven R. Salbu, Information Technology in the War Against International Bribery and 
Corruption: The Next Frontier in International Reform, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 67 (2001); 
Marie M. Dalton, Efficiency v. Morality: The Codification of Cultural Norms in the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 583, 619–20 (2006). 
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Professor Philip Nichols and others responding to Salbu 
advocating the opposite view—that people in all parts of the 
world will benefit if bribery and corruption are eliminated.116  
One author has argued that a “culture of corruption” (1) directly 
and negatively impacts the safety of ordinary consumers 
throughout the world who depend on imports; (2) directly 
undermines environmental reform technology and clean-up 
efforts globally, and (3) frustrates efforts to achieve very basic 
human rights.117  This issue is worthy of much more research 
and discussion, but is beyond the scope of this article. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In the first twenty-five years after the enactment of the FCPA in 1977, 
enforcement of the law was minimal.  This law was initially enacted to 
prevent U.S. businesses and individuals from using illicit payments to 
foreign officials “to influence any official act, induce unlawful action, or 
obtain or retain business.”118  Enforcement by the DOJ and SEC during 
its first twenty-five years amounted to less than three prosecutions per 
year.  Several factors led Congress to amend the law in 1988, and again 
in 1998.  These amendments substantially expanded the scope of the 
law. 
Since 2004, there has been a tremendous increase in FCPA enforcement 
actions by the SEC and DOJ—the number of FCPA investigations over 
the past six years has greatly surpassed the actions taken by the Federal 
Government during the entire period from the 1977 enactment of the 
FCPA through 2002.  Significant influences on this development may 
include the FCPA amendments, the enactment of SOX, the continuing 
series of financial scandals starting with Enron and continuing with the 
sub-prime mortgage scandal, the financial meltdown of 2008–2009, and 
the increasing globalization of business. 
The increase in FCPA prosecutions by the U.S. federal government 
has been accompanied by a heightened sense of the need to combat bribery 
around the world, to the signing of several important international anti-
corruption treaties, and to the enactment of laws similar to the FCPA in 
 
 116. Phillip M. Nichols, Regulating Transnational Bribery in Times of Globalizations 
and Fragmentation, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 257, 289 (1999); Phillip M. Nichols, The Myth 
of Anti-Bribery Laws as Transnational Intrusion, 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 627 (2000). 
 117. See, Elizabeth Spahn, International Bribery: The Moral Imperialism Critiques, 
18 MINN. J. INT’L L. 155 (2009); See also, Bill Shaw, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
and Progeny: Morally Unassailable, 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 689, 701 (2000). 
 118. Koch, supra note 5, at 383. 
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many other nations.  Along with new laws and treaties, anti-corruption 
cooperation between nations has also developed considerably since bribery 
in international business has consequences that cross national borders.  
Consequently, as more nations around the world enact anti-corruption 
laws and join anti-bribery treaties, corporations doing business in foreign 
nations are under the microscope.  Similarly, as foreign governments 
begin to prosecute corporations the world over, international anti-corruption 
compliance organizations and NGOs have formed to watch carefully for 
signs of corruption.  Other organizations assist corporations in understanding 
laws such as the FCPA and how to best avoid corruption violations 
when doing business in foreign nations. 
All of the developments surrounding the FCPA as discussed in this 
article, as well as the previously identified key issues needing further 
examination, will significantly affect the conduct of international business 
in the next decade.  It is essential for business leaders and legal scholars 
to carefully watch the development of new laws, treaties, and enforcement 
techniques, both in the United States and globally, as nations increase 
















APPENDIX A: PRE-FCPA CASES 
Appendix A includes pre-FCPA cases, including parties to the case, 
and details and the outcome of the case, all of which can be found in 
Table 2 below. 
Table 2: Pre-FCPA Cases 
Date Case Details and Outcome
N/A United States v. U.S. 
Lines, Inc. (Cr. No. ) 
Conspiracy to defraud the Federal 
Maritime Administration. Fine of 
$5,000.
1978 United States v. Sea-Land 
Service, Inc. (Cr. No. 78-
103) 
Conspiracy to defraud the Federal 
Maritime Administration. Fine of 
$5,000.
1978 United States v. Seatrain 
Lines, Inc. (Cr. No. 78-49) 
Conspiracy to defraud the Federal 
Maritime Administration and Currency 
and Foreign Transactions Reporting 
Act. Fines against Seatrain of $260,000 




United States v. The 
Williams Companies (Cr. 
No. 78-00144), D.D.C. 
Currency and Foreign Transactions 
Reporting Act (transporting currency in 
excess of $5,000 into and out of the 
United States without proper reporting). 
Fine and civil penalty of $187,000 
1978-Apr-
12 
United States v. Page 
Airways, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. 
Rep. (Cr. No. 79-00273) 
(CCH), 96,393 D.D.C.
Currency and Foreign Transactions 




United States v. Control 
Data Corporation (Cr. 
No. 78-00210), D.D.C.
Mail fraud and Currency and Foreign 




United States v. Company 
(Cr. No. 78-538), 
S.D.N.Y. 
United Brands paid $2.5 million in 
bribes to the president of Honduras in 
an effort to receive a reduced local tax 
on the exportation of bananas. The 
company also sought a twenty-year 
extension of favorable terms on its 
Honduran properties. Fine of $15,000. 
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United States v. 
Westinghouse Electric 
Company (Cr. No. 78-
00566), D.D.C.
False statements to the Export-Import 
Bank and Agency for International 
Development. Fine of $300,000. 
1979-Jun-1 United States v. Lockheed 
Corporation (Cr. No. 79-
00270), D.D.C. 
Currency and Foreign Transactions 
Reporting Act, wire fraud, false 
statements to Export Import Bank. Fine 
and penalties of $647,000.
1979-Jun-1 United States v. 
Gulfstream American 
Corporation (formerly 
known as Grumman 
American Aviation 
Corporation) (Cr. No. 79-
00007), D.D.C.
False statements to Export-Import Bank 
and Commerce Department (Shipper’s 
Export Declarations). Fine of $120,000. 
1979-Jul United States v. Textron, 
Inc. (Cr. No. 79-00330), 
D.D.C. 
Currency and Foreign Transactions 
Report Act. Fine and civil penalty of 
$131,670.
1981-Sep-8 United States v. 
McDonnell Douglas 
Corporation, et al. (Cr. 
No. 79-516), D.D.C.
Mail fraud, wire fraud, conspiracy, false 
statements to Export-Import Bank. 
Note: All above information was taken from FCPA Digest of Cases and Review 
Releases Relating to Bribes to Foreign Officials under the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act of 1977, by Shearman & Sterling LLP, March 4, 2010, pp. 371–73, 
available at http://www.shearman.com/files/upload/ FCPA-Digest-Spring-2010.pdf. 
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APPENDIX B: PRE-1998 FCPA CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 
Appendix B includes  FCPA cases prior to the 1998 amendment, 
including parties to the case and details and the outcome of the case, all 
of which can be found in Tables 3, 4, and 5 on the following pages. 
 
Table 3: Pre-1998 FCPA Criminal Prosecutions 
Date Case Details and Outcome 
1979 United States v. Kenny 
International Corp., (Cr. No. 
79-372), D.D.C. 
The company pled to one count of 
violating the FCPA and consented to an 
injunction against further FCPA violations. 
The corporation was fined $50,000 and 
required to pay restitution to the Cook 
Islands government in the amount of NZ 
$337,000. The chairman of Kenny Int’l 
consented to a civil injunction and agreed 
to enter a plea of guilty to criminal charges 
pending in the Cook Islands.
1982 United States v. Crawford 
Enterprises, Inc., Donald G. 
Crawford, William E. Hall, 
Mario S. Gonzalez, Ricardo G. 
Beltran, Andres I. Garcia, 
George S. McLean, Luis A. 
Uriarte, Al L. Eyster and 
James R. Smith, (Cr. No. H-
82-224), S.D.Tx, Houston 
Division, Crawford Ent.
Pled no contest & fined $3,450,000.  D. 
Crawford pled no contest & fined 
$309,000. W. Hall pled no contest & fined 
$150,000.  A. Garcia pled no contest & 
fined $75,000.  A. Eyster pled no contest & 
fined $5,000. J. Smith pled no contest & 
fined $5,000. G. McLean Acquitted   
1982 United States v. C.E. Miller 
Corporation and Charles E. 
Miller, (Cr. No. 82-788), C.D. 
Cal. 
The corporation pled guilty and was fined 
$20,000. The individual defendant pled 
guilty and was sentenced to three years’ 
probation and 500 hours community 
service.
Note: All above information was taken from “FCPA Prosecutions and Civil 
Enforcement Actions,” Int’l Agreements Relating to Bribery of Foreign Officials, U.S. 
Department of Justice. 
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APPENDIX B: PRE-1998 FCPA CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS                    
CONTINUED–TABLE 4 
Table 4: Pre-1998 FCPA Criminal Prosecutions (continued) 
1983 United States v. Marquis King, 
(Cr. No. 83-00020), D.D.C. 
The defendant pled guilty to violations of 
Currency and Foreign Transactions 
Reporting Act and was sentenced to 14 
months incarceration and required to pay 
prosecution costs. 
1982 United States v. Ruston Gas 
Turbines, Inc., (Cr. No. H-82-
207), S.D. Tex.  
The corporation pled guilty to an FCPA 
violation and was fined $750,000. 
1982 United States v. International 
Harvester Company, (Cr. No. 
82-244), S.D. Tex.  
The corporation pled guilty to one count of 
conspiracy to violate the FCPA and was 
fined $10,000 plus costs of $40,000. An 
individual defendant also pled guilty to one 
count and was sentenced to one year 
incarceration (suspended).
1983 United States v. Applied 
Process Products Overseas, 
Inc., (Cr. No. 83-00004), 
D.D.C. 
The company pled guilty to an FCPA 
violation and was fined $5,000. In addition 
it consented to a permanent civil 
injunction.
1983 United States v. Gary 
Bateman, (Cr. No. 83-00005), 
D.D.C.  
The defendant pled guilty to five CFTR 
misdemeanors and was sentenced to three 
years probation. In addition, he agreed to 
pay a civil penalty of $229,512, a civil tax 
payment of $300,000, and costs of 
prosecution of $5,000.
1983 United States v. Sam P. 
Wallace Company, Inc., (Cr. 
No. 83-0034) (PG), D.P.R. 
The corporation pled guilty to three counts 
of FCPA accounting violations and was 
fined $30,000. In addition, it also pled 
guilty to a CFTR violation and was fined 
$500,000.
1983 United States v. Alfonso A. 
Rodriguez, (Cr. No. 83-0044 
(JP)), D.P.R.  
The defendant pled guilty to one count of 
FCPA bribery and was sentenced to three 
years’ probation and fined $10,000. 
BIXBY (DO NOT DELETE) 12/9/2010  2:17 PM 
 
126 
1985 United States v. Harry G. 
Carpenter and W.S. Kirkpatrick, 
Inc., (Cr. No. 85-353), D.N.J. 
The corporation pled guilty to an 
FCPA violation and was fined 
$75,000. The individual defendant 
pled guilty to one count FCPA bribery 
and was sentenced to three years 
probation, community service, and a 
fine of $10,000.
1985 United States v. Silicon 
Contractors, Inc., Diversified 
Group, Inc., Herbert D. Hughes, 
Ronald R. Richardson, Richard L. 
Noble and John Sherman, (Cr. No. 
85-251), E.D. La. 
The corporation pled guilty to an 
FCPA violation, agreed to a permanent 
civil injunction, and was fined 
$150,000.  Hughes, Richardson, Noble 
and Sherman agreed to permanent 
injunctions in a civil case.
1989 United States v. NAPCO 
International, Inc. and Venturian 
Corporation, (Cr. No. 4-89-65), D. 
Minn. 
The defendants pled guilty to three 
counts of FCPA bribery and were 
fined $785,000. In addition, they paid 
$140,000 in a civil settlement and 
$75,000 to settle tax charges.
1989 United States v. Richard H. Liebo, 
(Cr. No. 4-89-76), D. Minn. 
The defendant was convicted of FCPA 
bribery and false statements and was 
sentenced to eighteen months 
incarceration (suspended) with three 
years probation.
1989 United States v. Goodyear 
International Corp., (Cr. No. 89-
0156), D.D.C. 
The corporation pled guilty to one 
count of FCPA bribery and was fined 
$250,000.
1989 United States v. Joaquin Pou, 
Alfredo G. Duran, and Jose Guasch 
(S.D. Fla. 1989) 
United States v. Robert Neil Gurin 
(S.D. Fla.) 
Guasch and Gurin pled guilty to 
conspiracy to violate the FCPA; Duran 
was acquitted at trial; Pou jumped bail. 
1990 United States v. Young Rubicam 
Inc., Arthur R. Klein, Thomas 
Spangenberg, Arnold Foote Jr., 
Eric Anthony Abrahams, and 
Steven M. McKenna, (Cr. No. N-
89-68 (PCD)), D. Conn.
The company pled guilty to one count 
of conspiracy to violate FCPA and was 
fined $500,000. 
1990 United States v. George V. Morton, 
(Cr. No. 3-90-061-H), N.D. Tex. 
(Dallas Div.).  
The defendant pled guilty to one count 
of conspiracy to violate FCPA and was 
sentenced to three years probation. 
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1990 United States v. John Blondek, 
Vernon R. Tull, Donald Castle and 
Darrell W.T. Lowry, (Cr. 741), 
N.D. Tex. 
Two of the defendants were acquitted 
at trial. The charges were dismissed 
against the two remaining defendants. 
In separate cases, the Canadian agent, 
Morton, pled to conspiracy to violate 
the FCPA and the company agreed to 
a civil injunction enjoining it from 
future violations of the FCPA.
1990 United States v. F.G. Mason 
Engineering and Francis G. 
Mason, (Case No. B-90-29), JAC, 
D. Conn.  
The corporation pled guilty to one 
count of conspiracy to violate the 
FCPA, was fined $75,000, and was 
required to pay restitution of 
$160,000. The individual defendant 
also pled guilty to one count of 
conspiracy to violate the FCPA, was 
sentenced to five years probation, and 
was fined $75,000 (joint with 
Company).
1990 United States v. Harris Corporation, 
John D. Iacobucci and Ronald L. 
Schultz, (Cr. No. 90-0456), N.D. Cal. 
The court granted a motion for 
judgment of acquittal at the close of 
the government’s case.
1994 United States v. Herbert Steindler, 
Rami Dotan, and Harold Katz, (Cr. 
No. 194-29), S.D. Ohio.  
One defendant pled guilty to three 
counts of conspiracy, wire fraud and 
money laundering and was sentenced 
to 84 months incarceration and 
required to forfeit $1,741,453. The 
remaining defendants are fugitives. 
Note: All above information was taken from “FCPA Prosecutions and Civil 
Enforcement Actions,” Int’l Agreements Relating to Bribery of Foreign Officials, U.S. 
Department of Justice. 
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APPENDIX B: PRE-1998 FCPA CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS                    
CONCLUDED–TABLE 5 
Table 5: Pre-1998 FCPA Criminal Prosecutions (concluded) 
Date Case Details and Outcome
1994 United States v. Vitusa 
Corporation, (Cr. No. 94-
253)(MTB), D.N.J. 
The corporation pled guilty to an FCPA 
violation and was fined $20,000. 
1994 United States v. Denny 
Herzberg, (Cr. No. 94-
254)(MTB), D.N.J. 
The defendant pled guilty to an FCPA 
violation and was sentenced to two years 
probation and fined $5,000.
1994 United States v. Lockheed 
Corporation, Suleiman A. 
Nassar and Allen R. Love, (Cr. 
No. 1:94-Cr-22-016), N.D., 
Ga. Atlanta Div.  
The corporation pled guilty to conspiracy 
to violate the FCPA and was fined $21.8 
million. In addition, it had to pay a $3 
million civil settlement. Defendant Nassar 
pled guilty to two counts and was 
sentenced to eighteen months 
imprisonment. Defendant Love pled 
guilty to one count in a related case and 
was fined $20,000.
Note: All above information was taken from “FCPA Prosecutions and Civil 
Enforcement Actions,” Int’l Agreements Relating to Bribery of Foreign Officials, 
U.S. Department of Justice. 
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APPENDIX C: NOTABLE FCPA CASES IN RECENT YEARS 
Appendix C includes  notable FCPA cases from 2003–2010, including 
parties to the case, and details and the outcome of the case, all of which 
can be found in Table 6 below through Table 8 on the following pages. 
 
Table 6: Notable FCPA Cases in Recent Years 
Date Case Details and Outcome
2010 United States v. BAE Systems 
PLC (D.D.C. 2010) 
In 2000, BAE Systems PLC formerly 
British Aerospace, made commitments 
to the U.S. government to create and 
implement policies and procedures to 
fall under compliance with FCPA. On 
February 4, 2010, the DOJ filed a 
criminal information, charging BAE 
with conspiring to defraud the United 
States and to make false statements to 
the U.S. government, and violating the 
Arms Export Control Act and 
International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations. BAE pleaded guilty and 
agreed to pay $400 million in 
penalties, implement a compliance 
system, and to retain a compliance 
monitor for three years. BAE was not 
charged with FCPA liability.
2009 United States v. Daniel Alvirez 
and Lee Allen Tolleson (D.D.C. 
2009) 
United States v. Helmie Ashiblie 
(D.D.C. 2009) 
United States v. Andrew Bigelow 
(D.D.C. 2009) 
United States v. R. Patrick 
Caldwell and Stephen Gerard 
Giordanella (D.D.C. 2009) 
On December 11, 2009, the DOJ 
charged the twenty-two executives and 
employees in the military and law 
enforcement equipment industry with 
conspiring to violate the FCPA, 
substantive violations of the FCPA, 
and conspiring to engage in money 
laundering. This is the single largest 
investigation and prosecution against 
individuals in the history of the 
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United States v. Yochanen R. 
Cohen (D.D.C. 2009) 
United States v. Haim Geri 
(D.D.C. 2009) 
United States v. Gregory Godsey 
and Mark Frederick Morales 
(D.D.C. 2009) 
United States v. Amaro Goncalves 
(D.D.C. 2009) 
United States v. Saul Mishkin 
(D.D.C. 2009) 
United States v. John M. 
Mushriqui and Jeana Mushriqui 
(D.D.C. 2009) 
United States v. David R. Painter 
and Lee M. Wares (D.D.C. 2009) 
United States v. Pankesh Patel 
(D.D.C. 2009) 
United States v. Ofer Paz (D.D.C. 
2009) 
United States v. Jonathan M. 
Spiller (D.D.C. 2009) 
United States v. Israel Weisler 
and Michael Sacks (D.D.C. 2009) 
United States v. John Benson 
Wier (D.D.C. 2009)
enforcement of FCPA. The FBI was 
brought in to complete the undercover 
investigation. The outcome is 
undetermined at this time. 
2009-
July 
United States v. Control 
Components, Inc. (C.D. Ca 2009) 
CCI pleaded guilty to two counts of 
violations of the anti-bribery 
provisions of the FCPA and one count 
of conspiracy to violate the FCPA and 
Travel Act. CCI agreed to pay a 
criminal fine of $18.2 million as well 
as adopt an anti-corruption compliance 
code, and a three year probation 
period. Six executives and two former 
employees have been indicted on 
related allegations. See below. 
2009 United States v. Novo Nordisk 
A/S,  (D.D.C. 2009) 
Novo Nordisk was charged with 
conspiracy to commit wire fraud and 
violate the books and records 
provisions of the FCPA. Charges were 
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dropped in exchange for a fine of $9 
million, cooperation with further 
investigation, a compliance program, 
$3 million in civil penalties, and $6 
million in disgorgement of profits in a 
settlement with the SEC. 
2009 United States v. Stuart Carson, 
Hong Carson, Paul Cosgrove, 
David Edmonds, Flavio Ricotti, 
and Han Yong Kim (C.D. Ca 
2009) 
All six defendants were indicted for 
conspiracy to violate the FCPA and the 
Travel Act. Additionally, Carson was 
indicted on two counts of bribery and 
one count for obstruction of justice for 
intentionally destroying records.  
Cosgrove was indicted on six counts of 
bribery under the FCPA and one count 
under the Travel Act. Edmonds was 
indicted on three counts of bribery 
under the FCPA and two counts under 
the Travel Act. Ricotti was indicted on 
one count of bribery under the FCPA 
and three counts under the Travel Act. 
Kim was indicted on two counts of 
bribery under the FCPA.”   
2009- 
Feb 
United States v. Jeffery Tesler 
and Wojciech J. Chodan (S.D. 
Tex. 2009) 
The eleven-count indictment includes 
one count of conspiring to violate the 
anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA 
and ten counts of violating the anti-
bribery provisions of the FCPA. The 
DOJ is seeking $132 million from 
Tesler and Chodan if convicted on 
more than one count.   
2009- 
Feb 
United States v. Kellogg Brown & 
Root LLC (S.D. Tex. 2009) 
Kellogg Brown & Root LLC pleaded 
guilty to one count of conspiring to 
violate the FCPA and four counts of 
violating the anti-bribery provisions of 
the FCPA. KBR agreed to pay $402 
million and Halliburton agreed to pay 
$382 million of the fine. Halliburton 
and KBR settled a separate SEC case 
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paying disgorgement of $177 million 
in profits.  In September 2008, Albert 
Stanley, former CEO and Chairman of 
Kellogg Brown & Root LLC, admitted 
he participated in a scheme to bribe 
Nigerian government officials. 
2008 United States v. Siemens 
Aktiengesellschaft (D.D.C 2008) 
United States v. Siemens 
S.A.(Argentina) (D.D.C 2008) 
United States v. Siemens 
Bangladesh Ltd. (D.D.C 2008) 
United States v. Siemens S.A. 
(Venezuela) (D.D.C. 2008) 
This seller of power and electrical 
equipment was the first company ever 
charged with a criminal violation of 
the FCPA. Siemens AG (Argentina) 
pleaded guilty to conspiring to violate 
the FCPA’s books and records 
provisions and paid criminal fines of 
$450 million on top of $350 million 
disgorgement of ill-gotten profits. 
German authorities collected additional 
penalties. Independent monitors were 
put in place for four years, and $3 
million in bank accounts were 
forfeiture for a bribery scheme in 
Bangladesh.   
2008-
Jan 
United States v. James K. Tillery 
and Paul G. Novak (S.D. Tex. 
2008) 
This oil and gas pipeline construction 
company was indicted on one count of 
conspiracy to violate the FCPA, two 
counts of violating FCPA, and one 
count of conspiracy to commit money 
laundering. 
2008 United States v. Fiat S.p.A., et al. 
United States v. Iveco S.p.A. 
(2008) 
United States v. CNH Italia S.p.A. 
(2008) 
United States v. CNH France S.A. 
(2008) 
In the U.N. Oil-for-Food Program in 
Iraq, the DOJ charged Iveco and CNH 
Italia with conspiracy to commit wire 
fraud and violate the FCPA’s books 
and records provisions. DOJ also 
alleged CNH France conspired to 
commit wire fraud. Fiat entered into a 
three-year deferred prosecution 
agreement with the DOJ and agreed to 
pay $7 million. In 2008, Fiat and CNH 
Global entered an agreement with the 
SEC for failure to maintain internal 
controls and for books and records 
violations. This agreement resulted in 
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$5.3 million in disgorgement of 
profits, pre-judgment interest of $1.9 
million, and $3.6 million in civil 
penalty. 
2008 United States v. Shu Quan-Sheng 
(E.D. Va. 2008) 
Shu Quan-Sheng pled guilty to one 
count of violating the FCPA and two 
counts of violating the Arms Control 
Export Act. Shu was ordered to forfeit 
$356,740 in commission payments, 
and was sentenced to fifty-one months 
in prison, followed by a two year 
supervised release.  
2008 United States v. Albert Jackson 
Stanley (2008) 
Albert Stanley, a former director of 
Kellogg, Brown, & Root, Inc. pleaded 
guilty to one count of conspiring to 
violate the FCPA and one count of 
conspiring to commit mail and wire 
fraud. Stanley faces seven years in 
prison and payment of $10.8 million in 
restitution.   
2008- 
June 
United States v. Faro 
Technologies Inc. (2008) 
Faro entered into a two year deferred-
prosecution agreement and agreed to 
pay $1.1 million in criminal penalties 
and a two-year period with an 
independent compliance officer.   
2008 United States v. Willbros Group, 
Inc., and Willbros Int’l, Inc. 
(2008) 
Willbros Group and Willbros 
International, procurement companies 
of oil and gas construction contracts, 
entered into a three year deferred 
prosecution agreement. A $22 million 
fine will be collected in four 
installments, and have a position for an 
independent corporate monitor for 
three years.   
2008 United States v. AB Volvo (2008) 
United States v. Volvo Construction 
Equipment AB (2008) 
United States v. Renault Trucks 
The parent company of Volvo 
Construction and Renault Trucks SAS, 
AB Volvo, entered into a three-year 
differed prosecution agreement with 
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SAS (2008) the DOJ and agreed to pay a fine of $7 
million. VCE and Renault were alleged 
to have committed conspiracy to 
commit wire fraud and violate FCPA’s 
books and records provisions. 
2007 United States v. Gerald Green 
and Patricia Green (C.D. Cal. 
2007) 
The Greens were arrested for money 
laundering, tax counts (Patricia) and an 
added count of obstruction of justice 
against Gerald. The Greens created 
contracts for the annual Bangkok 
International Film Festival. The 
Greens were found guilty of 
conspiracy to violate the FCPA and 
money laundering laws, and Patricia 
Green was found guilty of falsely 
subscribing U.S. income tax returns. 
2007 United States v. Chevron Corp. 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) 
Under the United Nations Oil-for-Food 
Program the Chevron Corp. purchased 
oil from Iraq. Chevron entered into a 
two-year deferred-prosecution 
agreement and agreed to pay a total of 
$27 million. In addition, the SEC 
issued charges against Chevron 
resulting in a monetary penalty of $3 
million and disgorgement of $25 
million.   
2007- 
Apr 
United States v. Baker Hughes 
Svcs. Int’l, Inc. (No: H-07-129) 
(S.D. Tex. April 2007) 
Baker Hughes is a U.S. oilfield 
services company. BHSI pleaded 
guilty to violations of the anti-bribery 
and books and records provisions of 
the FCPA and agreed to an $11 million 
criminal fine. BHSI also agreed to 
serve a three-year term of 
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United States v. Vetco Gray 
Controls Inc. et al., (No. 4:07-cr-
00004) (S.D. Tex. February 2006) 
United States v. Aibel Group Ltd. 
(No. 4:07-cr-00005) (S.D. Tex. 
February 2006) 
Vetco Gray Controls Inc., Vetco Gray 
Controls Ltd., and Vetco Gray UK Ltd. 
pleaded guilty to violations of the anti-
bribery provisions of the FCPA and 
agreed to a collective fine of $26 
million, paying $6 million, $8 million 
and $12 million respectively. They 
also agreed to hire an independent 
monitor to oversee the implementation 
of a robust compliance program, to 
undertake an investigation of the 
company’s operations as required 
under FCPA Opinion Release 04-02, 
and to agree that any potential buyer of 
the company would be bound to those 
monitoring and investigation 
conditions. 
Aibel Group Ltd entered a deferred 
prosecution agreement relating to the 
same underlying conduct. 
2006 United States v. Christian 
Sapsizian and Edgar Valverde 
Acosta (No. 1:06-cr-20797) (S.D. 
Fla. 2006) 
On March 20, 2007, a superseding 
indictment was filed against Mr. 
Sapsizian and Mr. Acosta. On June 7, 
2007, the DOJ announced that Mr. 
Sapsizian pleaded guilty to two counts 
of conspiracy and violating the FCPA. 
He now faces up to ten years in prison, 
$250,000 in fines, and $330,000 in 
forfeiture. The terms of his plea 
agreement provide for an immediate 
forfeiture of $261,500. Sentencing for 
Mr. Sapsizian has been set for 
December 20, 2007. Separately, on 
June 14, 2007, the Court transferred 
Mr. Acosta to fugitive status. 
2006 United States v. Jim Bob Brown 
(No. 4:06-cr-00316) (S.D. Tex. 
2006) 
On September 14, 2006, the DOJ 
reported that Brown pleaded guilty to 
violating the FCPA by conspiring with 
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others to bribe Nigerian and 
Ecuadorian officials. Brown is 
cooperating with the government’s 




United States v. SSI Int’l Far 
East, Ltd. (No. CR 06-398-KI) 
(D. Or. October 2006) 
SSI Korea agreed to plead guilty to 
violating the anti-bribery and 
accounting provisions of the FCPA 
and pay a $7.5 million penalty. 
Schnitzer Steel entered into a three-
year deferred prosecution agreement 
and agreed to retain a compliance 
monitor for three years. In the SEC 
proceeding, Schnitzer Steel agreed to 
pay disgorgement and prejudgment 
interest of $7.7 million and retain a 
compliance monitor. 
Note: Above information through United States v. Baker Hughes Svcs. Int’l, Inc was 
taken from FCPA Digest of Cases and Review Releases Relating to Bribes to Foreign 
Officials under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, by D. Newcomb, October 
5, 2007, pp. 23–27; Cases after United States v. Baker Hughes Svcs. Int’l,  were taken 
from FCPA Digest of Cases and Review Releases Relating to Bribes to Foreign 
Officials under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1997, by Shearman & Sterling 
LLP, October 1, 2009, pp. 31–77,  and the most recent information is from FCPA 
Digest of Cases and Review Releases Relating to Bribes to Foreign Officials under 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1997, by Shearman & Sterling LLP, March 4, 
2010, available at http://www.shearman.com/files/upload/FCPA-Digest-Spring-2010.pdf. 
 
BIXBY (DO NOT DELETE) 12/9/2010  2:17 PM 
[VOL. 12:  89, 2010]  The Lion Awakens 
  SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 
 137 
APPENDIX C: NOTABLE FCPA CASES IN RECENT YEARS                         
CONTINUED–TABLE 7 
Table 7: Notable FCPA Cases in Recent Years (continued) 
Date Case Details and Outcome
2006-
Oct 
United States v. Statoil ASA 
(No. 06-cr-00960-RJH-1) 
(S.D.N.Y. October 2006) 
Statoil entered a three-year deferred 
prosecution agreement and has admitted to 
violating the anti-bribery and accounting 
provisions of the FCPA. It has also agreed 
to pay a $10.5 million penalty. In the SEC 
proceeding, it has agreed to pay $10.5 
million in disgorgement and retain a monitor. 
Statoil has already paid a NOK 20 million 
($3.045 million USD) fine to the Norway 
National Authority for Investigation and 
Prosecution of Economic Crime, without 
admitting or denying any liability, which 
will be deducted from the U.S. fines. On 
October 18, 2004, Richard Hubbard accepted 
a fine of NOK 200,000 ($30,300). 
2006-
Jun 
United States v. Steven 
Lynwood Head (No. 06-cr-
01380) (S.D.Cal. June 2006) 
Steven Lynwood Head pled guilty to a 
one-count information charging 
falsification of the books, records and 
accounts of an issuer under the federal 
securities laws. Pursuant to the plea 
agreement, Head will cooperate with the 
government’s ongoing investigation of 
individuals formerly associated with Titan. 
In September 2007, Head was sentenced to 
six months imprisonment, supervised 




United States v. Richard John 
Novak (No. 05-180-3-LRS) 
(E.D.Wash. March 2006) 
On March 20, 2006, Novak pled guilty to 
one count of violating the FCPA and an 
additional count of wire fraud and mail 
fraud. Additional defendants involved in 
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the scheme have either pled guilty or are 
currently being prosecuted on various non-
FCPA charges. 
2006 United States v. Faheem 
Mousa Salam (No. 06-cr-
00157-RJL) (D.D.C. 2006) 
The government filed criminal information 
against Salam on June 7, 2006. On August 
4, 2006, Salam pled guilty to one count of 
violating the anti-bribery provisions of the 
FCPA. On February 2, 2007, Salam was 
sentenced to three years in prison followed 
by two years of supervised release. 
2005 United States v. DPC 
(Tianjin) Co. Ltd., (No. CR 
05-482) (C.D. CAL 2005) 
In the Matter of Diagnostic 
Products Corporation, SEC 
Administrative Proceeding 
File No. 3-11933 
(May 20, 2005) 
In a company filing dated August 2005, 
DPC disclosed that it had agreed to pay 
approximately $4.8 million as part of a 
settlement with the SEC and DOJ, 
consisting of $2.0 million in fines and 
approximately $2.8 million in 
disgorgement of profits and interest. In 
addition, Tianjin pled guilty to violations 
of the FCPA, was issued a cease and desist 
order, and agreed to take certain actions, 
including engaging an independent 
monitor for its FCPA activities in China, 





United States v. David Kay 
(Cr. No. 4-01-914) S.D. Tex., 
Dec. 12, 2001. 
United States v. David Kay 
and Douglas Murphy, (Cr. 
No. 4-01-914) S.D. Tex., Apr. 
2002 
As vice president of marketing for ARI, 
David Kay was responsible for supervising 
sales and marketing in Haiti. Kay was 
charged with twelve counts of violating 
the FCPA. Douglas Murphy, as president 
of ARI, was also charged with twelve 
counts of violating the FCPA. In May 
2002, U.S. District Judge David Hittner 
dismissed the indictments against Murphy 
and Kay. 
Note: All above information was taken from FCPA Digest of Cases and Review 
Releases Relating to Bribes to Foreign Officials under the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act of 1977, by D. Newcomb, October 5, 2007, pp. 28–50, Shearman & Sterling LLP. 
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APPENDIX C: NOTABLE FCPA CASES IN RECENT YEARS                    
CONCLUDED–TABLE 8 
Table 8: Notable FCPA Cases in Recent Years (concluded) 













United States v. Viktor Kozeny, 
Frederic Bourke, Jr., and David 
Pinkerton (Cr. No. 05-518) 
(S.D.N.Y. October 2005) 
United States v. Hans Bodmer 
(Cr. No. 03-947) (S.D.N.Y., 
August 2003) 
United States v. Clayton Lewis 
(Cr. No. 03-930) (S.D.N.Y., July 
2003) 
United States v. Thomas Farrell 
(Cr. No. 03-290) (S.D.N.Y., 
March 2003) 
On October 6, 2005, Kozeny, Bourke, 
and Pinkerton were charged in a twenty-
seven-count indictment in U.S. District 
Court in Manhattan. The indictment 
seeks, among other things, 
$174,000,000 in fines and forfeiture. 
Kozeny, an Irish citizen and resident of 
the Bahamas, has challenged the right of 
the United States to seek his extradition 
given that he is neither a U.S. citizen, 
nor a resident, and was not in violation 
of an offence under Bahamian law. On 
September 28, 2006, a court in the 
Bahamas ordered Kozeny to be extradited, 
although Kozeny’s lawyers announced 
that they intended to appeal the order. 
On June 21, 2007, the District Court in 
the Southern District of New York 
granted the motions to dismiss of 
Bourke and Pinkerton as to all FCPA 
counts. The court found that the 
indictment was time-barred because the 
government did not move to suspend the 
running of the statute of limitations to 
allow it to collect foreign evidence until 
after the statute of limitations had 
expired. The court found that filing such 
an application must be done before the 
running of the ordinary statute of 
limitations. The court found, in dicta, 
that the allegations were otherwise 
sufficient to withstand a motion to 
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dismiss. Certain false statements counts 
against the defendants survived the 
motion to dismiss. 
On July 5, 2007, the government moved 
for reconsideration of the court’s June 
21, 2007 decision, arguing that three of 
the counts of the indictment (including 
conspiracy to violate the FCPA and the 
Travel Act and a substantive FCPA 
violation) should not have been dismissed 
as time-barred. The court agreed with 
the government and on July 16, 2007, 
granted the government’s motion for 
reconsideration and reinstated these 
three counts. The government appealed 
the balance of the court’s June 21, 2007 
order to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit on July 
19, 2007. The appeal is currently being 
briefed, and oral argument is set for 
October 19, 2007. 
2005 United States v. Titan 
Corporation (Cr. No. 05-314), 
S.D. Cal. 2005 
Titan pleaded guilty on March 1, 2005, 
to three felony counts of violating the 
FCPA and agreed to pay a criminal fine 
of $13 million, along with a civil 
penalty and disgorgement to the SEC in 
the amount of approximately $15.5 
million. Titan also agreed to retain an 
independent consultant to review and 
further implement its FCPA compliance 
procedures. The combined penalty, 
$28.5 million, is the largest fine ever 
imposed on a company in the history of 
the FCPA. 
Note: All above information was taken from FCPA Digest of Cases and Review 
Releases Relating to Bribes to Foreign Officials under the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act of 1977, by D. Newcomb, October 5, 2007, pp. 32–40, Shearman & Sterling LLP. 
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APPENDIX D: INTERNATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION TREATIES 
Appendix D contains a list of International Anti-Corruption Treaties, all 
of which can be found in Table 9 below and continued on the next page. 
Table 9: International Anti-Corruption Treaties 
Treaty Name Purpose and Overview
Mutual Evaluation Mechanisms The Committee of Experts of the Follow-Up 
Mechanism for the Inter-American Convention 
Against Corruption began the second round of 
reviews this year. The Committee met again in 
December 2006 (too late for inclusion in this 
update) to finalize the first six reports. 
The Group of States Against 
Corruption (GRECO) 
Peer review organization that monitors the States 
Parties’ compliance with the Council of Europe’s 
anticorruption instruments issued second round 
reports on Andorra, Georgia, Moldova, and the 
Ukraine. 
The Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions 
Working Group on Bribery Monitors 
implementation of the Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions. In 2006, the OECD 
Working Group issued phase two country reports 
for Australia, Austria, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
and Spain and progress reports for Bulgaria, 
Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, and 
Luxembourg. 
The United Nations Convention 
Against Corruption 
The United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption entered into force on December 14, 
2005, and the first Conference of States Parties 
(COSP) was held in December 2006 in Amman, 
Jordan. The United States deposited its instrument 
of ratification on October 30, 2006. 
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United Nations Global 
Compact’s 10th Principle 
Against Corruption 
The U.N. Global Compact is an international 
multi-stakeholder initiative that brings companies 
together with U.N. agencies, labor, and civil 
society to promote responsible corporate 
citizenship through promotion of ten voluntary 
universal principles in the areas of human rights, 
labor, the environment, and anti-corruption. In 2006, 
the Global Compact Office published Business 
Against Corruption – Case Stories and Examples, a 
collection of case stories illustrating how its 
participants implemented the 10th Principle 
Against Corruption. 
The World Bank The World Bank’s Department of Institutional 
Integrity (INT) investigates allegations of fraud, 
corruption, collusion, and coercion, as well as 
obstructive practices related to Bank operations. 
The Bank is currently enhancing its investigation 
and sanctioning capabilities with proactive tools 
that further combat corruption through prevention 
and deterrence. One of these new tools is the 
Voluntary Disclosure Program (VDP), which was 
publicly launched on August 1, 2006. Under the 
VDP, participants commit to: (1) not engage in 
misconduct in the future; (2) disclose to the Bank 
the results of an internal investigation into past bad 
acts in Bank-financed or supported projects or 
contracts; and (3) implement a robust internal 
compliance program monitored by a Bank 
approved compliance monitor. Participants pay the 
costs associated with almost every step of the VDP 
process. In exchange for full cooperation, VDP 
participants avoid debarment for disclosed past 
misconduct, their identities are kept confidential, 
and they may continue to compete for Bank-
supported projects. 
Note: All above information was taken from Developments in U.S. and International 
Efforts to Prevent Corruption, by M. Ayres, J. Davis, N. Healy & A. Wrage, Summer 
2007, pp. 608–609, The International Lawyer. 
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APPENDIX E: ANTI-CORRUPTION COMPLIANCE ORGANIZATIONS 
Appendix E contains a list of Anti-Corruption Compliance Organizations, 
all of which can be found in Tables 10 and 11 below. 
 
Table 10: Anti-Corruption Compliance Organizations 
Organization Name Purpose and Overview
Center for International Private 
Enterprise’s (CIPE) 
The Center for International Private 
Enterprise’s (CIPE) anti-corruption work 
targets both supply- and demand-side 
corruption – those who demand bribes in 
exchange for services and those who supply 
bribes and demand preferential treatment. In 
2006, CIPE partnered with TRACE to 
provide anti-bribery training in seven 
countries. CIPE worked with Transparency 
International to promote the implementation 
of the Business Principles for Countering 
Bribery and to develop a Small to Medium 
Enterprise (SME) anti-bribery toolkit. In 
Lebanon, CIPE and the Lebanese 
Transparency Association developed and 
introduced a corporate governance code for 
SMEs. In Mozambique, CIPE teamed with 
the Sofala Commercial and Industrial 
Association to survey the business 
community, gauge corruption perceptions, 
and develop policy recommendations to 
reduce corruption. In Russia, CIPE is 
working with the INDEM foundation to 
provide businesspeople with tools to resist 
extortion by government officials. 
The Corner House U.K.-based research and advocacy group that 
focuses on how the government can combat 
corruption, and monitors particular cases of 
corruption involving U.K. companies and 
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individuals. In April 2006, the United 
Kingdom’s Export Credits Guarantee 
Department (ECGD) accepted many of the 
Corner House’s recommendations with 
regard to tightening its anti-corruption 
procedures. This followed an extensive 
consultation that resulted from Corner 
House’s judicial review of the ECGD’s 
earlier weakening of these procedures after 
industry lobbying. The Corner House also 
gave evidence to an influential Parliamentary 
Committee enquiry, the All Party Group, on 
Africa. The U.K. government’s response to 
the Committee’s final report in June 2006 
included taking up one of the Corner 
House’s key recommendations to the 
government of setting up a special police 
unit specifically to investigate overseas 
corruption offenses. 
The International Anti-Corruption 
Conference 
On November 15-18, 2006, Guatemala 
hosted the 12th International Anti-
Corruption Convention. The more than 1000 
representatives of 115 nations met in plenary 
and in workshops to discuss a range of issues 
in anti-corruption efforts, focusing on 
practical measures to reduce its deleterious 
effects. The resolution issued at the end of 
the conference focused on effective 
implementation of the UNCAC. The plenary 
also issued an “Action Agenda” to guide 
future efforts 
Note: All above information was taken from Developments in U.S. and International 
Efforts to Prevent Corruption, by M. Ayres, J. Davis, N. Healy & A. Wrage, Summer 
2007, pp. 610–611, The International Lawyer. 
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APPENDIX E: ANTI-CORRUPTION COMPLIANCE ORGANIZATIONS 
(CONCLUDED)–TABLE 11 
Table 11: Anti-Corruption Compliance Organizations 
(concluded) 
Organization Name Purpose and Overview
TRACE A nonprofit business association working with 
companies to improve their anti-bribery 
programs while lowering the cost associated 
with compliance. TRACE undertakes 
benchmarking research and disseminates the 
results to companies to help them ensure that 
their policies are squarely within “best 
practices.” In cooperation with partner law firms 
in seventy countries, TRACE also maintains an 
online Resource Center with summaries of 
foreign local law. At the end of 2006, TRACE 
announced the launch of BRIBEline, a 
multilingual anonymous hotline that will enable 
those from whom bribes are demanded to report 
the demand by country and government 
ministry. The information will be collated and 
reported in the aggregate as a new empirical 
measure of corruption. TRACE also held anti-
bribery workshops in twelve cities worldwide. 
The workshops are open to the public and cover 
the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 
international conventions, and local law. 
Transparency International. Transparency International (TI) and its chapters 
in ninety-five countries work with governments, 
civil society, and the private sector to address 
domestic and international corruption. TI has 
developed a set of corruption assessment tools, 
including National Integrity Surveys, the Global 
Corruption Barometer, the Bribe Payers Index, 
and the Corruption Perceptions Index. The 2006 
TI Global Corruption Report provided an 
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overview of the state of corruption around the 
world with a focus on the health sector. TI also 
advocates for effective development assistance 
by promoting anti-corruption and transparency 
requirements within major donor institutions 
such as the World Bank, actively promoting the 
development, implementation, and monitoring of 
international anti-corruption conventions, 
promoting transparency requirements in trade 
agreements, developing tools to enhance anti-
bribery standards in the private sector, and 
publishing an annual Progress Report on 
Enforcement of the OECD Convention to keep 
pressure on governments to increase 
enforcement. TI has also worked to secure U.S. 
ratification of the UNCAC and has developed 
recommendations for an effective UNCAC 
monitoring process.
Note: All above information was taken from Developments in U.S. and International 
Efforts to Prevent Corruption, by M. Ayres, J. Davis, N. Healy & A. Wrage, Summer 
2007, pp. 610–611, The International Lawyer. 
 
 
